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Playing Tricks on the Dead:
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company,
An Historical Inquiry
RICHARD ALLAN GERBER*
I. Introduction
On June 17, 1968, the United States Supreme Court ren-
dered its landmark decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.'
The Court in Jones held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982, originally en-
acted as part of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, banned all
racially based discrimination in the sale or rental of real or per-
sonal property,' and that the Thirteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution empowered Congress to prohibit pri-
vate, as well as state-sanctioned, racial discrimination of this
type.3
The Jones decision was based on the majority's perception
of the intent of the authors of the 1866 Act, the 39th Congress. 4
This perception grew, however, from an imperfect historical
analysis based, in part, on inadequate examination of historical
sources.5 It is precisely because of this use, or abuse, of history
that the 1968 Jones decision remains intrinsically interesting. A
critical examination of the Court's use of history in Jones is in-
tegral to a complete understanding of judicial decision making.
This paper will examine the historical analysis in Jones and
will propose steps to improve judicial historical analysis. This
examination will begin with the question of cosmolo-
gies 6-influences which condition both judges attempting to in-
* Ph.D., 1967, University of Michigan. Professor of Constitutional History and
Chairman of the History Department, Herbert H. Lehman College of the City University
of New York.
1. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
2. Id. at 413.
3. Id.
4. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 63-70 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text infra.
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terpret statutes and legislators drafting and enacting those stat-
utes. The problem of cosmological influence can become acute if,
as in Jones, the statute under judicial scrutiny was enacted in a
milieu many decades prior to its judicial evaluation. The exami-
nation will then focus on the political and social environment in
which the Jones Court made its decision, the turbulent 1960s.7
With this contextual background, the paper will present the ma-
jority' and dissenting9 opinions in Jones and commentary on
those opinions. 10 This analysis will demonstrate the need for a
critical examination of the political and social situation of the
1860s, the milieu of the 39th Congress.'
This paper will present this historian's view of the events
and moods of the Reconstruction period which informed and in-
fluenced the 39th Congress,1 and this historian's argument that
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, fashioned during Reconstruction as
a tool to impose order on the defeated South, was uniquely ap-
propriate as a tool in the late 1960s to impose order in a country
beset by racial and political strife." Finally, the paper will pro-
pose that the judicial decision-making process may be improved
by reliance on the expertise of historians."'
II. Cosmologies
All human beings are conditioned by what might be called
their "cosmologies." A person functions within the confines of a
particular time and space, a milieu of assumptions, presupposi-
tions, values, ideologies, interests, myths, historical perspectives,
training, experience and language, which limit and order his
mind. The influence of this ordering of mental processes is pow-
erful. Few can transcend the particular determinants of their
cultural points of reference.
In the process of historical analysis, any interpreter might
unwittingly project his own contemporary values and ideas onto
7. See notes 19-33 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 45-83 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 84-133 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 134-68 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 169-78 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 179-240 and accompanying text infra.
13. See note 241 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 242-50 and accompanying text infra.
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people and events of a different time and place. 15 Even the most
fair-intentioned observer might unknowingly color the evalua-
tion of the past with the brush of the present, because past and
present continually inform and illuminate one another. This in-
teraction, which impelled Thomas Jefferson to insist that every
generation must write its own history," also precipitated the re-
mark commonly attributed to the French philosopher Voltaire
that history is a pack of tricks we play on the dead.17
Supreme Court Justices, like other humans, cannot totally
escape their own backgrounds and conditioning. It is difficult to
imagine that even the loftiest of judges could be so clinical as to
be unaffected by the world around him. Certainly, during the
1960s, the members of the Warren Court were neither ignorant
of, nor isolated from, the issues of the decade.' 8 Individually and
collectively they must have been deeply affected by the eddies of
activist idealism and the turbulence of the unravelling of tradi-
tional institutions.
III. The 1960s: Milieu of Jones
The Jones decision stands as an integral part of the social
and political fabric of 1968. The mid-1960s witnessed the legisla-
tive innovations of Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency " and the
reformist decisions of the Warren Court,20 striking legislative
15. See C. BECKER, EVERYMAN His OWN HISTORIAN (1935); H. BUTrrTERFLD, THE
WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1931); E. H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? (1961); R. G.
COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY (1946); J. HIGHAM, L. KRIEGER & F. GILBERT, His-
TORY (1965); THE HISTORIAN AND THE CLIMATE OF OPINION (R. Skotheim ed. 1969); D.
NOBLE, HISTORIANs AGAINST HISTORY (1965); P. SMITH, THE HISTORIAN AND HISTORY
(1960).
16. K. LEHMANN, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AMERICAN HUMANIST 100 (1965).
17. See F. VOLTAIRE, JRANNoT Er COLIN, ROMANS gr Co.rrEs 131 (Paris 1960).
"Toutes les histoires anciens ... ne sont que les fables convenues." Id.
18. For critical assessments of the Warren Court, see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT (1968); P. KUR-
LAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970).
19. See notes 21-22 infra.
20. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring a state statute, which
prohibited interracial marriage, unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the leourteenth Amendment); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) (upholding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to conclude that racial
discrimination by certain local restaurants burdens interstate trade); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in places of public accommodation,
1980] t
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and judicial progress in the advancement of civil rights and the
enforcement of equal opportunity. The procession of civil rights
legislation,21 together with massive federal assistance to citizens
and cities,22 testified to the national commitment to true equal-
ity for all Americans and raised markedly the aspirations of ur-
ban blacks for social and economic equality. Paradoxically, dur-
ing this same period, the daily lives of America's blacks showed
little or no improvement.2 3 Frustration and bitterness resulted
whether or not the transportation of persons between states is "commercial"); Watson v.
Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (striking down segregation in city-owned or city-operated
parks).
21. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in various
sections of 18, 25, 42 U.S.C.) (Title I, making criminal certain acts associated with the
inciting of riots and civil disorders and providing federal protection against interference
with the right to participate in specifically listed activities; Title VII, prohibiting dis-
crimination in the sale, rental or financing of housing); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1976))
(prohibiting voting qualifications or prerequisites which deny or abridge the right to vote
of any citizen on account of race or color); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241 (codified in various sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.) (Title I, strengthening fed-
eral enforcement of the right to vote; Title II, providing injunctive relief against discrim-
ination in public accommodations); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat.
86 (codified in various sections of 18, 20, 42 U.S.C.) (Title I, providing criminal penalties
for violation of court orders which protect the exercise of civil rights; Title III, extending
the powers of the Civil Rights Commission). These statutes are summarized in P. MUR-
PHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 1918-1969, at 341-69, 406, 416 (1972).
22. Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 89-174, 79
Stat. 667 (1965) (codified in various sections of 3, 5, 12, 42 U.S.C.) (establishing a De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development to administer federal programs providing
assistance for housing); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified in various sections of 12, 15, 20, 38, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C.) (provid-
ing federal financial assistance to develop housing for low and moderate income families
and to promote urban development); Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (amending various sections of 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.) (improving federal-
state public assistance programs); Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified in various sections of 20 U.S.C.) (providing feder-
al financial assistance to improve educational quality and opportunity in elementary and
secondary schools); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508
(codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.) (providing federal employment programs to
combat poverty in the United States).
23. During the 1960s, the gap between white affluence and black poverty continued
to widen; blacks faced greater economic hardship in the mid-1960s than in 1954. See
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 251-65 (N.Y. Times
ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER COMMISSION REPORT). See generally W.
LEUCHTENBURG, A TROUBLED FEAST: AMERICAN SOCIETY SINCE 1945 (1979); B. MUSE, THE
AMERICAN NEGRO REVOLUTION: FROM NONVIOLENCE TO BLACK POWER, 1963-1967 (1968);
W. O'NELL, COMING APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960's (1971).
Notwithstanding the liberalism of the Warren Court, over ninety percent of the
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/3
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as their hopes remained unfulfilled. 4
By 1968, the springtime spirit of reform of the mid-1960s
had turned into a season of social and political violence. Presi-
dent Johnson's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disor-
ders, chaired by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, directly attrib-
uted the country's racial discord to white discrimination.2 The
violence coalesced tragically when, on April 4, 1968, the Rever-
end Martin Luther King, Jr., became a martyr for the civil
rights cause he had championed.2 King's murder touched off
bloodshed and looting.27 The nation's capital erupted in three
days of the worst burning and destruction since the British
razed Washington in 1814.28
Mounting political instability accompanied the increasing
racial tension. The turmoil generated by the national debate
over America's role in the war in Vietnam continued to esca-
late.29 On March 31, 1968, President Johnson announced his de-
cision not to seek re-election, leaving the contest for the Demo-
cratic nomination initially to Senators Eugene R. McCarthy of
state schools which had been segregated prior to 1954 remained so ten years after the
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUS-
TICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 758 (1976). An excellent discussion of the Brown decision and its impact
is provided in R. KLUGER, supra.
24. See AMERICAN VIOLENCE 258-69 (R. Hofstadter & M. Wallace eds. 1970); W.
GRIER & P. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968); NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA (S. Lynd ed. 1966); C.
SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE (1964); Rustin, The Harlem Riot and Nonvi-
olence, WRL News [War Resisters League], July-August, 1964, at 3, reprinted in NoNVI-
OLENCE IN AMERICA, supra, at 495.
25. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 2. In 1967, following the Newark
and Detroit riots, the bloodiest of the 164 riots of that tumultuous year, President John-
son appointed the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly referred
to as the Kerner Commission. The Kerner Commission reported in February, 1968:
"What white Americans have never fully understood-but what the Negro can never
forget-is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions cre-
ated it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it." Id.
26. For excellent accounts of the life of Martin Luther King, Jr., see BLACK PROTEST
IN THE SIXTIES (A. Meier & E. Rudwick eds. 1970); D. LEWIS, MARTIN LUTHER KING: A
CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1970).
27. M. VIORST, FIRE IN THE STszErs 436 (1979).
28. B. GILBERT & THE STAFF OF THE Washington Post, TEN BLOCKS FROM THE WHITE
HOUSE: ANATOMY OF THE WASHINGTON RIOTS OF 1968 (1968).
29. See, e.g., L. CHESTER, G. HODGSON, & B. PAGE, AN AMERICAN MELODRAMA: THE
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1968 (1969); D. ENGLISH & THE STAFF OF THE London Daily
Express, DIVIDED THEY STAND (1969).
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Minnesota and Robert F. Kennedy of New York.30 On June 5,
1968, on the very night of his personal victory in the California
Democratic primary, Senator Kennedy was murdered.31 Less
than two weeks after Senator Kennedy's death, as the high tide
of reform activism of the mid-1960s retreated before the wave of
racial and political unrest, the Supreme Court of the United
States rendered its decision in Jones.32
What was the magnitude and form of the impact which
these events surely had on the Supreme Court in 1968? Did the
Court focus on a result, prohibiting private racial discrimination
purposefully to provide a powerful boost for a discouraged civil
rights crusade or to mitigate the unrest in the cities? Was the
extensive historical analysis found in Jones merely summoned
as justification for this result? Some commentators have accused
the Warren Court of engaging in this form of "special
pleading."33
It is this writer's contention that the impact of the trau-
matic events of the 1960s on the Justices was more subtle. These
events were a part of the cosmology of each Justice who sat to
decide the Jones case. Did the Justices allow their cosmologies
to influence their inquiries in ways which affected their histori-
cal analysis, or were they able to transcend their cosmological
conditioning and reach an historical interpretation that accords
with the most reliable evidence available? Did they, or did they
30. M. VIoRST, supra note 27, at 447.
31. See L. CHESTER, supra note 29, at 349-62; D. ENGLISH, supra note 29, at 243-51;
J. NEWFIELD, ROBERT KENNEDY 289-300 (1969); W. O'NEILL, supra note 23, at 371-84.
32. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). For discussion of Jones, see
notes 34-133 and accompanying text infra.
33. See, e.g., Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv.
119.
Well before the Jones decision, the late Professor Alfred H. Kelly, a noted constitu-
tional historian, had asserted that the Warren Court frequently invented its own special
interpretations of the historical events upon which its decisions turned. Lamenting that
"an appeal to the past. , . [had] been recruited for activist purposes of interventionist
political implications," id. at 157, Professor Kelly had contended that many Warren
Court decisions "are essentially pieces of special pleading," id. at 155, that intentionally
had distorted the past "to serve the interests of libertarian idealism" in the present. Id.
at 157. Professor Kelly had argued that, while "law-office history" might be appropriate
for an attorney to prepare for his client, "judges are supposed to resolve opposing claims
of counsel in such a way as to produce something coherent in terms of justice, legal
continuity, or ascertainable law." Id. at 156.
[Vol. 1:59
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not, "play tricks on the dead"?
IV. The Jones Decision
A. Background
Joseph Lee Jones, a black citizen, had sought to purchase a
home in Paddock Woods, a suburb of St. Louis, Missouri. 4 He
complained that the Alfred H. Mayer Company, the owner of
the property, had refused to sell him the home because, and only
because, of his race. 5 Jones sued for relief based, in part,86 on 42
U.S.C. § 1982, which provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.37
Section 1982 had been enacted originally as part of section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866." The 1866 Act itself had
34. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968).
35. Id.
36. Id. The petitioner sought injunctive relief and "invoked the jurisdiction of the
District Court to award 'damages or. . . equitable or other relief under any Act of Con-
gress providing for the protection of civil rights ... ' 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4)." Id. at 412 &
n. 1.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
38. The statute was entitled An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in
their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27
(1866) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights Act of 18661. Section 1 of the 1866 Act provides:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. Congress reenacted the entire Civil Rights Act of 1866 in a statute entitled An Act to
enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this
Union, and for other Purposes, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) [hereinafter cited as
Enforcement Act of 1870]. In the Revised Statutes of 1874, section 1 of the 1866 Act was
codified in sections 1977 and 1978. Under current codification, section 1 of the 1866 Act
became 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.
7
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been passed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, the antislavery amendment, which
was declared ratified on December 18, 1865.31
Both the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri,40 the court of original jurisdiction, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1 on ap-
peal, found for the Mayer Company, holding that section 1982
did not cover private refusals to sell, but could be applied only
to discriminatory state action. The case, which came to the Su-
preme Court on grant of certiorari,42 presented the Court with
the opportunity to consider whether section 1982 was intended
to prohibit private discriminatory actions, and whether section
1982 was a constitutional exercise of congressional authority
under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.43 On June 17,
1968, the Supreme Court sweepingly reversed the judgment of
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and ruled that "[section]
1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in
the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus con-
strued, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce
39. The Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
Section 1: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2: Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend XIII.
40. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966). The District
Court maintained:
The language of Sections 1981 and 1982, reciting certain rights of citizens of the
United States (e.g. to purchase, sell, hold and convey real and personal property
and to make and enforce contracts) is broad and general. The legal right to
purchase property does not, however, carry with it a corresponding obligation on
the part of the owner to enter into a contract of sale against his will.
It is now well settled that these civil rights statutes are directed toward gov-
ernment action.
Id. at 119 (citations omitted).
41. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967). The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court decision, noted that the Supreme Court in
prior cases had "imposed upon § 1982 a distinct and definite Fourteenth Amendment
overlay with the state action limitation." Id. at 43.
42. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 389 U.S. 968 (1967).
43. For the Supreme Court's treatment of section 1982 prior to Jones, see note 91
and accompanying text infra.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/3
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the Thirteenth Amendment."' 44
B. The Majority Opinion
The reasoning of the Court in Jones, embodied in the ma-
jority opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart,4' raised signifi-
cant issues of legal history and of historical interpretation. In
reaching its decision, the Court first focused upon the specific
language of section 1982.46 Second, because section 1982's prede-
cessor was section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court
looked to the language and structure of the 1866 Act,' as well as
to the intent of the enacting legislative body, the 39th Con-
gress.'8 Third, the Court considered what effect the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the passage of subsequent
legislation had on the scope of the 1866 Act."9 And, fourth, the
Court inquired into the congressional authority under the Thir-
teenth Amendment to promulgate the 1866 Act.8 0
1. Text of Section 1982
The Court in Jones noted that, "[iln plain and unambigu-
ous terms, § 1982 grants to all citizens, without regard to race or
color, 'the same right' to purchase and lease property 'as is en-
joyed by white citizens."' 5  The Mayer Company had contended
that even though the language of section 1982 could be read lit-
erally to encompass private acts, the 39th Congress intended a
more restrictive interpretation. In the view of the Mayer Com-
44. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (emphasis in original).
The Court elected not to base its decision in Jones on Equal Protection grounds; the
Court explained that "[b]ecause we have concluded that the discrimination alleged in
the petitioners' complaint violated a federal statute that Congress had the power to en-
act under the Thirteenth Amendment, we find it unnecessary to decide whether that
discrimination also violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 413 n. 5.
45. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Brennan, Stewart, Fortas, and Mar-
shall comprised the majority. Justice Douglas concurred. Justices Harlan and White dis-
sented in an opinion written by Justice Harlan.
46. See notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra.
47. See notes 55-59 and accompanying text infra.
48. See notes 60-68 and accompanying text infra.
49. See notes 69-73 and accompanying text infra.
50. See notes 74-83 and accompanying text infra.
51. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420 (1968).
1980]
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pany, the 39th Congress, the authors of the language of section 1
of the 1866 Act which became section 1982, could not possibly
have intended the "revolutionary implications" of extending its
coverage to private owners.52 In response, the Court declared:
"Our examination of the relevant history . persuades us that
Congress meant exactly what it said."58
2. Civil Rights Act of 1866
Language and Structure
To buttress its broad interpretation of section 1982, the
Court in Jones focused upon the language and structure of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. After reviewing the entire text of sec-
tion 1 of the 1866 Act," the precursor of section 1982, the Court
stated:
The crucial language for our purposes was that which guaranteed
all citizens "the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States,. . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property . . . as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens ... ." To the Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of
1866, it was clear that the right to do these things might be in-
fringed not only by "State or local law" but also by "custom, or
prejudice.""
In reaching its conclusion that section 1 also applied to private
discrimination, discrimination caused by "custom or prejudice,"
the Court concentrated upon the broad description of rights
52. Id. at 421-22.
53. Id. at 422.
54. For the text of section 1 of the 1866 Act, see note 38 supra.
55. 392 U.S. at 423. The language "custom or prejudice" was taken from another
Reconstruction legislative proposal, a bill to increase the powers of the Freedmen's Bu-
reau (the "Freedmen's bill"). The Court noted that "the [Freedmen's] bill was ... sig-
nificant for its recognition that the 'right to purchase' was a right that could be 'refused
or denied' by 'custom or prejudice' as well as by 'state or local law.'" Id. at 423 n. 30.
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1866 referred to "custom" rather than "custom or
prejudice," the Court in Jones found no significance in this difference in language. Id. at
424 n. 31. For support for this interpretation, the Court in Jones cited the remarks in the
Congressional Globe of Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio and Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois. Id. at 424 n. 31 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292,
322-23 (1866)). For a description of the Freedmen's Bureau and the text of the Freed-
men's bill, see note 98 infra, and for the dissent's comparison of the Freedmen's bill and
the 1866 Act, see notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 1:59
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granted in section 1. The Court believed that the words "any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding" did not modify or limit the rights granted, but
instead were inserted to qualify the penalty clause of section 1 of
the 1866 Act."'
The Court's examination of the structure of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 provided further evidence that the 39th Congress,
through section 1 of the Act, intended to reach private, as well
as state-sanctioned, racial discrimination. Section 2 of the 1866
Act imposed criminal penalties on only those potential violators
of section 1 who acted "under color of any law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, or custom.' 7 This restriction of the class of
violators would have been unnecessary if both sections of the
1866 Act had been intended to reach the same actors." The lan-
56. 329 U.S. at 422-23 n. 29. The Court observed, in a footnote:
It is, of course, immaterial that § 1 [of the 1866 Act] ended with the words "any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding."
The phrase was obviously inserted to qualify the reference to "like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other," thus emphasizing the supremacy of the
1866 statute over inconsistent state or local laws, if any. It was deleted, presum-
ably as surplusage, in § 1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874.
Id.
57. Civil Rights Act of 1866, supra note 38, at § 2. Section 2 provides:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to
different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any
time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason
of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
For the text of section 1 of the 1866 Act, see note 38 supra.
58. 392 U.S. at 424-26. The Court reasoned:
Indeed, if § 1 had been intended to grant nothing more than an immunity from
governmental interference, then much of § 2 would have made no sense at all. For
that section, which provided fines and prison terms for certain individuals who
deprived others of rights 'secured or protected' by § 1, was carefully drafted to
exempt private violations of § 1 from the criminal sanctions it imposed. There
would, of course, have been no private violations to exempt if the only 'right'
granted by § 1 had been a right to be free of discrimination by public officials.
Id. Under this reasoning, violations of section 1 resulting from private actions, while
exempt from the criminal sanctions imposed by section 2, could be remedied through
civil action or injunctive relief. Id. at 425 n. 33.
11
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guage and structure of the 1866 Act led the Court to conclude
"that § 1 was meant to prohibit all racially motivated depriva-
tions of the rights enumerated in the statute, although only
those deprivations perpetrated 'under color of law' were to be
criminally punishable under § 2."59
Legislative History
In an attempt to counter a broad interpretation of the 1866
Act, the Mayer Company had argued that Congress, by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, intended only to strike down the
iniquitous laws of the former rebel states, most particularly the
Black Codes." The effect of those state statutes (enacted in
1865 and 1866, during the initial phases of Reconstruction) was
to return the freed people to a condition close enough to slavery
to have deprived them of the practical substance of their newly
gained liberty. The Court in Jones, using historical data, ac-
knowledged the legislative goal of eliminating the Black Codes,
but asserted that the 39th Congress was confronted with sub-
stantial evidence revealing the mistreatment by white persons of
blacks by means wholly independent of hostile state legisla-
tion.6 1 In light of this the Court reasoned that the legislators
59. Id. at 426. In support of this conclusion, the Court discussed the remarks of
Representative James F. Wilson of Iowa, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
and floor manager of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, in response to a question about why
criminal penalties were limited to violations committed under color of law. Id. at 425 n.
33. Representative Wilson had replied that the punishment provision exempted private
violations because the Judiciary Committee had no desire to create a "general criminal
code for the States." Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1120 (1866)). The
Court reasoned that, if Representative Wilson had intended private discrimination to
constitute no violation of section 1 whatsoever, he would have said so in this colloquy. Id.
60. 392 U.S. at 426. The Black Codes, actually a series of laws passed by the former
confederate states during 1865-1866, represented the South's attempt to minimize the
effects of emancipation. These measures covered such subjects as vagrancy, apprentice-
ship, labor contracts, and social relations of the newly freed blacks. See, e.g., 1865 Miss.
Laws 82-90; 1866 N.C. Pub. Laws 99; 13 S.C. Stat. 269 (1865). See also REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF REFUGEES, FREEDMEN, AND ABANDONED LANDS, H.R.
Exxc. Doc. No. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865). For discussions of the Black Codes and
the attitudes they embodied, see D. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED
LABOR AFTER SLAVERY (1978); T. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965); F.
WOOD, BLACK SCARE: THE RACIST RESPONSE TO EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1968).
61. 392 U.S. at 427-29. The Court particularly stressed the study by Carl Schurz,
who had toured the South after Appomattox. This study emphasized the "private hostil-
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perceived their mission as far broader than "merely the nullifi-
cation of racist laws" in the southern states.62
For additional historical support of this broad interpreta-
tion of the 1866 Act, the Court turned to the congressional de-
bates on the 1866 Act. The remarks of Illinois Senator Lyman
Trumbull, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commitee and au-
thor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, provided the Court with
eloquent statements of the grander, more visionary intent of the
39th Congress." When Senator Trumbull introduced the bill
which subsequently became the Civil Rights Act of 1866, he pro-
claimed that this legislation would translate the grant of free-
dom in the Thirteenth Amendment into practice: "There is very
little importance in the general declaration of abstract truths
and principles unless they can be carried into effect . .. .""
The Senator further stated that the 1866 Act would, in addition
to destroying the Black Codes, guarantee to men of any race or
color "the right to acquire property, the right to go and come at
pleasure, the right to enforce rights in the courts, to make con-
tracts, and to inherit and dispose of property."6 5 According to
Senator Trumbull, the 1866 Act would "break down all discrimi-
ity" whites felt toward their former slaves, the "lawless acts of brutality" visited upon
the blacks, and "the need to protect them from the resulting persecution and discrimina-
tion." Id. at 428-29 (quoting C. SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDIrrioN OF THE SOUTH, S.
EXEC. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 17-25 (1865)) (Schurz's Report is reprinted in
1 SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ 279 (F. Bancroft
ed. 1913) [hereinafter cited as SPEECHES]). Schurz, a German immigrant who had come
to America after the Revolution of 1848, served as Lincoln's Ambassador to Spain, and
as a "political General" for the last two years of the Civil War. A prominent Republican,
Schurz also served as Senator from Missouri, and later as Secretary of the Interior under
President Hayes. See C. SCHURZ, THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ (1907-08).
62. 392 U.S. at 429. Indeed, the Court noted that, in the First Session of the 39th
Congress, three early Senate proposals had been defeated precisely because each was
"too narrowly" limited to invalidating discriminatory state laws only. Id. For discussion
of the proposals, one by Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson and two by Massachusetts
Senator Charles Sumner, see id. at 429 n. 46 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
39, 91 (1865)).
63. On December 13, 1865, shortly before the formal ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Senator Trumbull had promised a bill, pursuant to that Amendment, "to
protect the freedman in his rights." Id. at 430 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 43 (1865)).
For an excellent biography of Senator Trumbull, see M. KRUG, LYMAN TRUMBULL,
CONSERvATivE RADICAL (1965).
64. Id. at 431 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866)).
65. Id. at 432 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866)).
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nation between black men and white men. ' 6
From the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the
House of Representatives, 67 the Court drew conclusions compa-
rable to those it had deduced from the Senate debates: namely,
that the 39th Congress understood fully that it was approving "a
comprehensive statute forbidding all racial discrimination af-
fecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the Act." 8
In short, by its examination of the language and structure of
the 1866 Act and by its interpretation of legislative intent
gleaned from an examination of congressional debates, the Court
in Jones was convinced that section 1982 prohibited all racial
discrimination, whether under the color of law or by private ac-
tion, in the sale or rental of property.69
3. Impact on the 1866 Act of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Enforcement Act of 1870
The Court next inquired whether the intended scope of the
1866 Act had been affected by two subsequent events. Had the
adoption in 1868 of the Fourteenth Amendment,70 which, by its
66. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866)) (emphasis in
original).
For the dissent's discussion of Senator Trumbull's statements, see notes 109-15 and
accompanying text infra.
67. The Court quoted the remarks of Representative M. Russell Thayer of Penn-
sylvania and Representative Burton C. Cook of Illinois as illustrative of opinion in the
House. 392 U.S. at 433-34. Representative Thayer commented that the object of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was "to carry out and guaranty the reality" of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, to give it "practical effect and force." Id. at 434 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1151 (1866)). To Representative Cook, it was evident that, without appropriate
federal legislation, any "combination of men in (a] neighborhood [could] prevent [a Ne-
gro] from having any chance" to enjoy the benefits of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at
434 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1124 (1866)).
These remarks and others convinced the Court that the 39th Congress understood
section 1 of the 1866 Act to permit federal intervention to stop any person who would, in
the words of Senator Henry S. Lane of Indiana, "invoke the power of local prejudice"
against blacks. Id. at 433 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1866)).
For the dissent's discussion of the House debates, see notes 116-17 and accompany-
ing text infra.
68. 392 U.S. at 435.
69. Id. at 436.
70. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
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terms, applied to deprivations resulting from state action, super-
seded or eliminated the private discrimination sanctions of the
1866 Act? Had the readoption of the 1866 Act as section 18 of
the Enforcement Act of 1870,1 which had been specifically
designed to implement the Fourteenth Amendment, reduced the
purview of the 1866 Act to only that discrimination occurring
under color of law?
The Court concluded that the reach of the 1866 Act re-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States ac-
cording to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in
aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss
or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be
held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
71. Enforcement Act of 1870, supra note 38, § 18. The Enforcement Act of 1870
reaffirmed the civil and political rights of blacks as guaranteed by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. It authorized federal courts, marshals and district attorneys to
enforce penalties against states, groups and individuals who interfered with registration
or voting in congressional elections and empowered the President to use United States
land and naval forces to enforce the 1870 Act.
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mained unchanged despite these subsequent developments.7"
Nothing in the history of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment or in the enactment of the 1870 Enforcement Act,
the Court asserted, justified the notion that either the Four-
teenth Amendment or the 1870 Enforcement Act limited the
scope of the 1866 Act to only state-sanctioned discrimination. 3
4. Congressional Power Under the Thirteenth
Amendment
Finally, the Court addressed the question of whether the
1866 Act, and thus section 1982, was a constitutional exercise of
congressional authority under section 2, the Enabling Clause, of
the Thirteenth Amendment.7' Specifically, did the Amendment's
grant of "power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion" provide Congress with the authority to prohibit private ra-
cial discrimination in the sale of real and personal property? In
its affirmative response, the Court concluded that the reach of
the Thirteenth Amendment extended far beyond empowering
Congress to abolish the legal foundation of slavery.7 5 The Court
determined the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment by examin-
ing the Amendment's legislative history76 and statements by
Senator Trumbull, who had brought the Amendment to the floor
of the Senate in 1864, defending the constitutionality of the
72. 392 U.S. at 436.
It is quite true that some members of Congress supported the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "in order to eliminate doubt as to the constitutional validity of the Civil
Rights Act as applied to the States.". . . But it certainly does not follow that the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or the subsequent readoption of the Civil
Rights Act were meant somehow to limit its application to state action.
Id. at 436 (quoting Hurd v. Dodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948)).
The Court further argued that in light of the fact that the southern states operating
under the congressional mandates of the Reconstruction Acts had repealed their discrim-
inatory laws, "it would obviously make no sense to assume, without any historical sup-
port whatever, that [the 41st] Congress made a silent decision in 1870 to exempt private
discrimination from the operation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866." Id. at 437.
For discussion of the Reconstruction Acts, see note 214 infra.
73. 392 U.S. at 436-37.
74. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce
section 1 of the Amendment by appropriate legislation. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. For the
text of the Thirteenth Amendment, see note 39 supra.
75. 392 U.S. at 439.
76. Id.
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1866 Act under the Enabling Clause of the Amendment."'
The Court reconciled its current interpretation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, as articulated by Justice Stewart, with its
views in 1883, as expressed by Justice Bradley in the Civil
Rights Cases.78 The Court in Jones read this earlier decision to
mean that section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment imbued
Congress with power "to pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
77. Id. at 440. Senator Trumbull had argued that the Enabling Clause of the Thir-
teenth Amendment must have been intended to empower Congress to "destroy all...
discriminations in civil rights against the black man." 392 U.S. at 440 (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866)). Otherwise, he had continued, "our constitu-
tional amendment amounts to nothing." Id.
78. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The 1883 decision held the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, entitled An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights,
ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights Act of 1875], an unconstitu-
tional exercise of the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the
sanctions of the Fourteenth Amendment operate only against state-sanctioned actions,
not against private actions. 109 U.S. at 11, 26. The 1875 Act had required equal accom-
modations at inns and hotels, on conveyances and in places of amusement, restaurants,
and the like, whether publicly or privately owned. Id. at 11. In considering the 1875 Act's
constitutionality under the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court in the Civil Rights Cases
stated that the Enabling Clause of the Amendment clothes "Congress with power to
pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in
the United States." Id. at 20. The Court held, however, that these acts of private dis-
crimination at inns and the like did not constitute badges of slavery and were, therefore,
not barred by the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 24. In reference to the Thirteenth
Amendment, Justice Bradley declared for the majority in the Civil Rights Cases: "It
would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of
discrimination which a person may see fit to make . I..." Id.
In contrast, the Court in Jones concluded that a black person's inability to buy and
sell property on an equal footing with a white was a badge of slavery which Congress
could eliminate under the Thirteenth Amendment. 392 U.S. at 441. In further support of
this position, the Court in Jones stated that this proposition was one which was agreed
upon by the entire Court in the Civil Rights Cases:
[W]e note that the entire Court agreed upon at least one proposition: The Thir-
teenth Amendment authorizes Congress not only to outlaw all forms of slavery
and involuntary servitude but also to eradicate the last vestiges and incidents of a
society half slave and half free, by securing to all citizens, of every race and color,
"the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens."
Id. at 441 n. 78 (quoting 109 U.S. at 22).
For the dissent's treatment of the Civil Rights Cases, see note 91 and accompanying
text infra. See generally L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
1877-1917, at 193-96 (1971); Westin, The Case of the Prejudiced Doorkeeper, in QUAR-
RELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 128 (J. Garraty ed. 1964).
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States. '70 Moreover, the Amendment authorized Congress "ra-
tionally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of
slavery," and provided Congress with the authority "to translate
that determination into effective legislation."80 Congress, the
Court reasoned, could enact statutes that redressed discrimina-
tory acts, "whether sanctioned by State legislation or not."81
The Court's opinion concluded with a ringing historical
analogy. Just as the Black Codes had served as substitutes for
slavery, the exclusions of blacks from white communities also
served as substitutes for the Black Codes: "when racial discrimi-
nation herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of
slavery. ' 82 The Court in Jones asserted:
At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to se-
cure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to
buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a
white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man
means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made
a promise the Nation cannot keep.83
By ruling that section 1982 reached private, as well as state-
sanctioned, racial discrimination in the sale of property, the
Court had kept the nation's promise.
C. The Dissent
Justice John M. Harlan's dissent,84 by contrast, included no
impassioned declarations of a national promise. A straightfor-
ward, occasionally clinical, refutation of the majority's proof, his
opinion addressed first the language of section 1982;15 second,
the language and structure, 6 and the legislative history,8 7 of the
79. 392 U.S. at 439 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
80. Id. at 440.
81. Id. at 438 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883)).
82. Id. at 442-43. The Court in Jones quoted the words of Representative James
Wilson of Iowa, who, in reference to the 1866 Act, spoke to conditions of all times, in-
cluding 1968: "A man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this bill cannot be re-
duced to slavery." Id. at 444 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866)).
83. Id. at 443.
84. Id. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. See notes 91-96 and accompanying text infra.
86. See notes 98-107 and accompanying text infra.
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Civil Rights Act of 1866; third, the effect on the scope of the
1866 Act of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment;88 and
fourth, congressional authority under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to promulgate the 1866 Act.89 Justice Harlan argued that
the congressional purpose in enacting the statute was only to
nullify state-sanctioned discrimination; private discrimination
was not intended to be affected by the 1866 Act.90
1. Text of Section 1982
Justice Harlan noted that, in the past, the Supreme Court
had consistently rejected the proposition that the statutory
predecessors of section 1982 applied to private acts of discrimi-
nation.9 1 Next, he questioned the Court's "literal" interpretation
of the language of section 1982. In the sentence, "All citizens
. . . shall have the same right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property," 92 the word
"right," to Justice Harlan, possessed an "inherent ambiguity."93
The majority had assumed that the word "right" referred to a
fundamental power residing in an individual, and thus a "right"
enforceable against any other individual. " On the other hand, if
the word "right" encompassed merely a grant of "equal status
under the law," then the application of section 1982 would be
87. See notes 108-22 and accompanying text infra.
88. See notes 124-26 and accompanying text infra.
89. See notes 129-33 and accompanying text infra.
90. 392 U.S. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 450-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan relied upon three cases: the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which Justice Bradley had stated in dictum that
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, supra note 38, from which section 1982 is derived, was
"intended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings .... "
id. at 16-17; Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), in which the Court held that the
immediate predecessor of section 1982, section 1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874,
supra note 38, could not be used to invalidate private contracts for disposition of prop-
erty, id. at 331; Hurd v. Dodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), in which the Court held that the
immediate predecessor of section 1982 applied to "governmental action," but not to vol-
untary adherence to private contracts, even if the private contracts included discrimina-
tory restrictive covenants. Id. at 31. On the subject of restrictive covenants, see C. VosE,
CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
CASES (1959).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). For text of section 1982, see text accompanying note 37
supra.
93. 392 U.S. at 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 420-21.
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limited to state-sanctioned discrimination."5 Justice Harlan pre-
ferred the latter, narrower construction."
2. Civil Rights Act of 1866
Language and Structure
The dissent used an analysis of the language and structure
of the 1866 Act to support its narrow interpretation of section
1982, as had the majority to support its broad interpretation."7
Justice Harlan focused on a difference in language between the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedmen's bill,es a legislative
proposal designed to help the newly freed slaves. While the
Freedmen's bill provided penalties for violations of civil rights
occurring "in consequence of any State or local law, ordinance,
police or other regulation, custom, or prejudice,"99 presumably
reaching private as well as official violations, the roughly parallel
section 1 of the 1866 Act omitted the words "or prejudice."100
To Justice Harlan, this difference indicated that the 1866 Act
"was meant to provide protection only against those discrimina-
95. Id. at 453 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
96. Id. Justice Harlan relied upon the precedent established by Justice Bradley in
the Civil Rights Cases, in which identical language in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (the
predecessor statute to section 1982, see note 38 supra) had been interpreted to protect
only those civil rights impaired by wrongful acts sanctioned by state law or authority. Id.
at n. 9 (citing the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883)).
97. See notes 54-59 and accompanying text supra.
98. 392 U.S. at 455-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In 1865, Congress had established a
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, commonly called the Freedmen's
Bureau, with authority to feed, clothe, protect, educate and otherwise assist the newly
emancipated slaves in their adjustment to freedom. An Act to establish a Bureau for the
Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865) [hereinafter cited as Freed-
men's Bureau Act]. Several weeks prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Con-
gress had enacted another bill (the "Freedmen's bill") to increase the powers of the
Freedmen's Bureau by extending military jurisdiction over certain areas of the South
where
in consequence of any State or local law, .. custom, or prejudice, any of the civil
rights . . . belonging to white persons (including the right . . . to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. . .) are refused
or denied to negroes . . . on account of race, color, or any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude . . ..
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1866). The Freedmen's bill was vetoed by the
President, and the Senate failed to override this veto. Id. at 915-16, 943 (1866).
99. 392 U.S. at 456 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
100. For the text of section 1 of the 1866 Act, see note 38 supra.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/3
JONES V. ALFRED H. MAYER CO.
tions which were legitimated by a state or community sanction
sufficiently powerful to deserve the name 'custom.'"101
Justice Harlan next examined the structure of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. He rejected the majority's contention that
section 2 "was carefully drafted to exempt private violations of §
1 from the criminal sanctions it imposed,"'1 2 and suggested that
it was equally fair to conclude "that § 2 was carefully drafted to
enforce all of the rights secured by § 1.0'" Justice Harlan also
noted that the structure of the Freedmen's bill paralleled that of
the 1866 Act.'" To Justice Harlan, the facts that both statutes
had been "drafted by the same hand," that of Senator Trum-
bull,'0 1 and that the Freedmen's bill "defined both the rights se-
cured and the denials of those rights which were criminally pun-
ishable in terms of acts done under the aegis of a State or
locality,"'10 6 confirmed "that the limitation to 'state action' was
deliberate" 107 in the 1866 Act.
Legislative History
Justice Harlan next proceeded to examine the intent of the
39th Congress. He argued that the legislative history did not
necessarily support the Court's interpretation and that "a con-
trary conclusion may equally well be drawn."108 He quoted with
relish a number of remarks by the ubiquitous Senator Trumbull
which reinforced the narrower, "state action" construction of the
1866 Act.109 On January 29, 1866, for example, Senator Trum-
101. 392 U.S. at 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority in Jones found this dif-
ference in language to be insignificant. See note 55 supra.
102. 392 U.S. at 454 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For the majority's discussion of sec-
tion 2 of the 1866 Act, see notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
103. 392 U.S. at 454 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. Justice Harlan admitted that the section of the Freedmen's bill which de-
fined the rights secured included one additional right, "denials which occurred 'in conse-
quence of a state or local . . . prejudice,'" which was not included in the section of the
bill which provided for criminal punishment. He stressed, however, that this additional
right was not included in the rights-defining section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. If
the reference to "prejudice" were removed from the Freedmen's bill, both the rights-
defining and criminal-sanctions sections of the bill would be textually parallel.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 454 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. In respect of the prospective adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, Senator
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bull had indicated that the 1866 Act would "have no operation
in any State where the laws are equal, where all persons have
the same civil rights without regard to color or race." 110 On April
4, 1866, Senator Trumbull had remarked that "this act neither
has nor was intended to have anything to do with" the case in
which a black's rights have been impinged in a state with no
discriminatory legislation, "because he has adequate remedies in
the state courts."' Later that same day, Senator Trumbull ex-
plained that his objective in sponsoring the 1866 Act was to se-
cure "equality in civil rights when denied by State authorities
to freedmen and all other inhabitants of the United States."'" 2
As to the majority's reliance on Senator Trumbull's remarks to
support the position that the 1866 Act was intended to reach
"private discrimination,""I Justice Harlan responded that
"upon more circumspect analysis than the Court has chosen to
give,"" " Senator Trumbull's statements were compatible with a
"state action" concept, or ambiguous, or taken out of context, or
irrelevant."5
Trumbull had stated that the Enabling Clause was included in the Amendment "for the
purpose, and none other, of preventing State Legislatures from enslaving, under any pre-
tense, those whom the first clause declared should be free." Id. at 455 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865)). Justice Harlan observed:
"[It seems inferable that this was also to be the aim of [the Freedmen's bill and the bill
which eventually became the 1866 Act]." Id. at 456 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 459 (Harlan, J.; dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
476 (1866)) (emphasis added by Justice Harlan omitted). The majority in Jones replied
to the dissent's use of this statement by Senator Trumbull:
[Tihe Senator was simply observing that the Act would "in no manner [interfere]
with the . . . regulations of any State which protects [sic] all alike in their rights
of person and property." ... That is, the Act would have no effect upon nondis-
criminatory legislation. Senator Trumbull obviously could not have meant that
the law would apply to racial discrimination in some States but not in others, for
the bill on its face applied upon its enactment "in every State and Territory in the
United States .... "
Id. at 426 n. 35 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1761 (1866)).
111. Id. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1758 (1866)).
112. Id. at 461 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1760 (1866)) (emphasis added by Justice Harlan). For other remarks of Senator Trum-
bull quoted by the dissent in Jones, see id. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600, 1758 (1866)).
113. For remarks by Senator Trumbull quoted by the majority in Jones, see notes
63-66 and accompanying text supra.
114. 392 U.S. at 462 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 462-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). To show that Senator Trumbull viewed
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The debates in the House of Representatives, according to
the dissent in Jones, also provided evidence that the 1866 Act
was intended to cover only state-sanctioned discrimination. Iowa
Representative James F. Wilson, the bill's floor manager, stated
that "the entire structure of this bill rests on the discrimination
relative to civil rights and immunities made by the states on 'ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of slavery.' "Ile Justice
section 2 of the 1866 Act, which "plainly extended only to 'state action,'" id. at 458
(Harlan, J., dissenting), as co-extensive with section 1, Justice Harlan quoted the Sena-
tor's response to a question by Senator Edgar A. Cowan of Pennsylvania whether any
provision to punish state officers was included in the bill which was to become the 1866
Act: "Not State officers, especially, but everybody who violates the law. It is the inten-
tion to punish everybody who violates the law." Id. at 458 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (1866)) (emphasis added by Justice Harlan
omitted). Justice Harlan added in a footnote:
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, suggest how Senator Trumbull might have
expected § 2 to affect persons other than "officers" in spite of its "under color"
language, for it was there said in dictum that: "The Civil Rights Bill ... is analo-
gous . . . to [a law] under the original Constitution, declaring that the validity of
contracts should not be impaired, and that if any person bound by a contract
should refuse to comply with it, under color or pretence that it had been ren-
dered void or invalid by a State law, he should be liable to an action upon it in
the courts of the United States, with the addition of a penalty for setting up such
an unjust and unconstitutional defence [sic]."
Id. n. 19 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting 109 U.S. at 17) (emphasis added by Justice
Harlan).
The majority in Jones answered this argument by noting:
That remark [of Senator Trumbull]. . .was nothing more than a reply to Senator
Cowan's charge that § 2 was "exceedingly objectionable" in singling out, for the
first time "in the history of civilized legislation," state judicial officers for
punishment.
Id. at 425 n. 33 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (1866)).
For the majority's discussion of Senator Trumbull's statements, see notes 63-66 and
accompanying text supra.
116. 392 U.S. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1118 (1866)) (emphasis added by Justice Harlan omitted). Representative Wilson
asserted that the federal government possessed power to "protect a citizen of the United
States against a violation of his rights by the law of a single State .. .without which
[power] the States can run riot over every fundamental right belonging to citizens of the
United States." Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1119 (1866)) (emphasis added by Justice Harlan omitted).
Justice Harlan also quoted the comments of Representative Samuel Shellabarger of
Ohio, a proponent of the 1866 Act, in reference to its section 1:
The bill does not reach mere private wrongs, but only those done under color of
state authority . . . [Its whole force is expended in defeating an attempt, under
State laws, to deprive races and the members thereof as such of the rights enu-
merated in this Act. This is the whole of it.
Id. at 467-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293-94
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Harlan briefly considered, and dismissed as unpersuasive, the
House debates cited by the Court in support of its position that
section 1982 reached private discrimination.'1 7
Donning the historian's mantle, Justice Harlan explained
that the Court's "private action" interpretation of the 1866 Act
was incompatible with the prevailing political ideology of the
"last third of the 19th century." 18 Many of the participants in
the congressional debates of the 39th Congress, Harlan claimed,
inevitably must have shared the individualistic ethic of their
time, which emphasized personal freedom and embodied a dis-
taste for governmental interference which was soon to culminate
in the era of laissez-faire."1 9
Justice Harlan believed that this individualism would have im-
pelled most Congressmen to view federal infringement of a per-
son's freedom to dispose of his own property "as a great intru-
(1866)).
From statements by Representative William Lawrence of Ohio, id. at 468 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832-33 (1866)), the dissent
extracted a definition of the term "right" in section 1 of the bill as meaning "equal legal
status." Id. at 469 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Hence, Justice Harlan concluded, Representa-
tive Lawrence "believed that the sole effect of the bill was to prohibit state-imposed
discrimination." Id.
Statements made by Representatives M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania and John
Bingham of Ohio similarly were cited in the dissent as support for the "state action"
construction. Id. at 466-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1151-53, 1291 (1866)).
117. Id. at 469-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For the majority's discussion of the
House debates, see notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
118. 392 U.S. at 473 & n. 54 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan concluded that
his analysis of the language, structure and legislative history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
showed "that the Court's thesis that the Act was meant to extend to purely private ac-
tion is open to the most serious doubt, if indeed it does not render that thesis wholly
untenable." Id. at 473.
119. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). For these historical generaliza-
tions, Justice Harlan quoted Samuel E. Morison's remark'that the events of the last
third of the Nineteenth Century occurred "in a framework of pioneer individualistic mo-
res," id. n. 54 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 788 (1965) and citing 3 V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT 7-22 (1930)). Id. Justice Harlan also noted the suggestion of Kenneth Stampp,
that the Radical Republicans failed to enact any land reform measure because it
"smacked too much of 'paternalism' and interference with property rights." Id. n. 55
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at
126-31 (1965)).
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sion on individual liberty.' 20 Moreover, Justice Harlan recalled
that in 1866 racial prejudice and patterns of black exclusion ex-
isted as abundantly in the North as in the South; residential
segregation was certainly the "prevailing pattern" throughout
the Northern states. 121 Given that historical perspective, Justice
Harlan surmised that a law which prohibited purely private dis-
crimination in all property transactions, let alone the sale or
rental of housing, would have come under severe attack both
within and outside the 39th Congress. The fact that the 1866
Act received no such criticism on that very point was "strong
additional evidence that it was not regarded as extending so
far. 1 22
In short, by his examination of the language and structure
of the 1866 Act and by his interpretation of the legislative intent
of the 39th Congress as disclosed in the congressional debates,
Justice Harlan was convinced that section 1982 did not prohibit
racial discrimination by private action in the sale or rental of
property, except perhaps "official, community-sanctioned dis-
crimination in the South, engaged in pursuant to local 'customs'
which in the recent time of slavery probably were embodied in
laws or regulations."' 2
3. Impact on the 1866 Act of the Fourteenth Amendment
Justice Harlan concluded the primary portion of his dissent
by directing his attention to the Fourteenth Amendment with a
plea for interpretive continuity. To accept the "state action"
construction of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would permit a cer-
tain consistency of interpretation between it and the language
of, as well as the intent of those who drafted and those who rati-
fied, the Fourteenth Amendment, "which this Court has consist-
ently held to reach only 'state action.' "1124 A "state action" limi-
tation on the scope of the 1866 Act would achieve a salutary
effect, Justice Harlan proposed,
in light of the wide agreement that a major purpose of the Four-
120. Id. at 473-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 474-75 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
124. Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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teenth Amendment, at least in the minds of its congressional pro-
ponents, was to assure that the rights conferred by the then re-
cently enacted Civil Rights Act would not be taken away by a
subsequent Congress. ""
Thus, while the Fourteenth Amendment did not impose new
limits on the scope of the 1866 Act, the legislative history of the
Amendment confirmed to Justice Harlan that the 1866 Act had
always been limited to only state-sanctioned discrimination."'
4. Congressional Power Under the Thirteenth
Amendment
In his dissent, Justice Harlan never explicitly resolved the
question of whether the 1866 Act was a constitutional exercise of
congressional power under the Enabling Clause of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. He began the final section of his dissent,
however, by stressing the significance of the Court's holding that
"the Thirteenth Amendment is sufficient constitutional author-
ity for § 1982 as interpreted [by the majority]. ' ' 127 He noted that
contemporary supporters of the 1866 Act had doubted that its
goals were constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment,
1 2 8
and that the Supreme Court had "twice expressed similar
doubts. ' '1 29
He further noted that in the time since the Court had heard
oral arguments in Jones, Congress had enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1968,130 which would provide injunctive relief and dam-
125. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In a footnote, Justice Harlan
cited the following historical works in support of his conclusion: H. FLACK, THE ADoP-
TION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 94 (1908); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 126-28, 179 (1956); 2 S. MoIsoN & H. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 39 (4th ed. 1950); K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION,
1865-1877, at 136 (1965); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 224 (1965); L. WARSOFF,
EQUALITY AND THE LAW 126 (1938). Id. at 476 n. 66 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
126. Justice Harlan did not discuss the effect the Enforcement Act of 1870 had on
the 1866 Act. For the majority's discussion of the 1870 Act, see notes 70-73 and accom-
panying text supra.
127. 392 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 476-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S.
1, 16-18 (1906) and Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926), but comparing the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)).
130. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in various sections of 18, 42 U.S.C.).
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ages from developers who refused to sell houses, on account of
race or color, to prospective buyers318 Since the type of relief
sought by petitioners in Jones would soon be available under
this "presumptively constitutional Act, 1 8 2 Justice Harlan con-
cluded that the case possessed "such 'isolated significance,' in
comparison with its difficulties," that the writ of certiorari
should be dismissed as improvidently granted.1 33
V. Reactions of Commentators on Jones
Commentators rushed to the law journals to record their
professional opinions of the decision in Jones. Within a year, the
detractors and defenders of the Court in Jones had scrutinized
every aspect of the case and had developed argumentation wor-
thy of the Justices themselves.13' Critics of the Jones decision
131. 392 U.S. at 477-78 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 478 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 480 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349
U.S. 70, 76-77 (1955)). The fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1968, supra note 130, would
not apply to the discrimination alleged by the petitioners in Jones did not dissuade Jus-
tice Harlan.
[T]he certiorari jurisdiction was not conferred upon this Court "merely to give the
defeated party in the . ..Court of Appeals another hearing," Magnum Co. v.
Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163, or "for the benefit of the particular litigants," Rice v.
Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 74, but to decide issues, "the settlement of
which is of importance to the public as distinguished from ... the parties,"
Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 393.
Id. at 478-79 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134. In addition to the many professional articles, see notes 137-68 and accompa-
nying text infra, law journals were replete with student writings commenting on the
Jones decision. See, e.g., Open Housing: Jones v. Alfred" H. Mayer Co. and Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 AM. U.L. REv. 553 (1969); Constitutional Law - Open
Housing - End of the Need for "State Action" in 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 22 ARK. L. REV. 773
(1969); Constitutional Law: Civil Rights; 42 U.S.C. § 1982 Held to Prohibit Owner of
Private Property from Refusing to Rent or Sell Solely Because of Race, 35 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 275 (1969); Constitutional Law - 1866 Civil Rights Act Held Constitutional Under
the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 594 (1968-1969); Civil Rights - Protec-
tion Under the Thirteenth Amendment - Housing Discrimination, 20 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 448 (1969); Civil Rights - Private Housing -Civil Rights Act of 1866 Held to Pro-
hibit Discrimination in Sales and Rentals, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 277 (1968); The "New"
Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1294 (1969); Open
Housing - 1866 Civil Rights Act - 1968 Civil Rights Act - Thirteenth Amendment, 29
LA. L. REV. 158 (1968); Civil Rights: Housing Discrimination - Revival of Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 53 MINN. L. REV. 641 (1969); Constitutional Law - Racial Discrimination -
Expanded Power of Congress to Use the Thirteenth Amendment, 41 U. COLO. L. REV.
152 (1969); Civil Rights - Discrimination in the Sale of Private Property, 23 U. MIAMI L.
1980]
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condemned the Court for its rampant activism. 5" Admirers, on
the other hand, delighted by the affirmative justice embodied in
the decision, lustily praised the Court for encouraging racial
equality."16
The opening salvo of criticism was fired by Professor Louis
Henkin.13 7 In the November 1968 issue of the Harvard Law Re-
view, Professor Henkin maintained that the Court, assuming a
legislative role, had provided blacks with property rights that
whites did not possess.138 He charged, moreover, that in prior
Court decisions private discrimination had frequently been as-
serted to be a badge or incident of slavery but had consistently
been denied that status by the Court. 39 Professor Henkin
stopped short of accusing the Court of political motives, but as-
serted that the Jones decision "is surely disingenuous, and bor-
ders on chutzpah."1140
Professor Gerhard Casper, writing in The Supreme Court
Review in 1968,14 offered a far more extensive, but no less criti-
cal, analysis. He agreed with Justice Harlan that the purpose of
REV. 225 (1968); Constitutional Law - Civil Rights - The Right for an Individual to Buy
Property Under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 268 (1969).
135. For comments by critics of the Jones decision, see notes 137-51 and accompa-
nying text infra.
136. For comments by supporters of the Jones decision, see notes 153-68 and ac-
companying text infra.
137. Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term, Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 82-87 (1968).
138. Id. at 85. Professor Henkin charged the majority with overstepping traditional
judicial bounds by enacting judicial legislation, with being "carried away by opportunity
and temptation to do also Congress' share and to give the country statutes which no
Congress ever enacted." Id. at 83. Professor Henkin declared that, by manipulating lan-
guage, the Court had protected blacks beyond the intended scope of section 1982. If a
seller refused a white buyer, for whatever reason, the buyer had no redress in the federal
courts; blacks, however, could now rely on section 1982 for relief. Id. at 85. Professor
Henkin observed: "The Court failed to distinguish between what meaning words will
carry and what they will not, between interpretation and perversion, between the judicial
function and that of Congress." Id. at 86.
139. Id. at 87. See note 91 and accompanying text supra. Professor Henkin dis-
puted the Court's contention that Congress could, pursuant to the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, determine the badges and incidents of slavery and then ban them. He argued that
such definition was a judicial function, or at least subject to judicial limitations. Id. at
86-87.
140. Id. at 86.
141. Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT.
REV. 89.
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the 1866 Act was merely to repeal, in the southern states, dis-
crimination by law and custom; the Court had erred in con-
verting the law into a contemporary "fair housing" statute.142
Professor Casper found several comments in the debates of the
39th Congress regarding legislative restrictions on the purchase
of land by blacks, but determined that "residential segregation
was not a subject of discussion. "I"' He argued that the Court,
compounding the distortion, had misread the Civil Rights Cases
of 1883 as saying that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized
Congress to eradicate all vestiges of slavery.' 4 4 The Jones Court,
Professor Casper asserted, had invented the interpretation they
had pronounced as law, and thus had engaged in "authoritative
revelation. "145
The Court's reasoning provoked Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
142. Id. at 121-22. Enlarging and elaborating on Justice Harlan's dissent, Professor
Casper arrayed the comments, on the floor of Congress, of Representatives James F.
Wilson, Samuel Shellabarger, Michael C. Kerr, and others to counter Justice Stewart's
interpretation of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as applicable to private dis-
crimination. Id. at 113-16. Similarly, Professor Casper disputed at length the Court's
interpretation of Senator Trumbull's remarks, see notes 63-66 and accompanying text
supra, particularly those of December 13, 1865, in which Trumbull promised that he
would submit a civil rights bill. Casper, supra note 141, at 97, 102, 111-13. Professor
Casper also noted that, in 1860, only 1.2 percent of the nation's blacks lived outside the
southern states. Id. at 108. He concluded that "the major goal of the act, though it was
couched in language which made it applicable throughout the Union, was to give practi-
cal effect to the repeal of discriminatory laws and customs in the South." Id. at 121
(footnotes omitted).
143. Id. at 104-05. Professor Casper admitted that the evidence from congressional
debates was "much more ambiguous, and even contradictory, than either the Court or
Mr. Justice Harlan allow." Id. at 117. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 might be limited to
simple conferral of "civil capacity upon citizens who were deprived of it by state or other
law," as Justice Harlan had claimed, or "it might... be wider in scope." Id. at 104. He
noted that the debates suggest that the 1866 Act might be read as banning some private
acts. Id. at 121. The 1866 Act could not, however, be interpreted so broadly as to cover
the contemporary dilemma of fair housing. Id. at 122. Professor Casper observed that the
issue of private refusals to sell or lease land to freedmen was mentioned explicitly on
only one occasion during the congressional debates. Id. at 105. "The Civil Rights Act,
interpreted historically, does not address itself to the problem [of fair housing]." Id. at
122.
144. Id. at 126. Professor Casper also quoted Justice Bradley's familiar statement
from the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 that it would mean "'running the slavery argument
into the ground' to see private discrimination as imposing 'badges of slavery.' "Id. at 126
(quoting 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883)). For discussion of the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 by
the majority in Jones, see notes 78-81 and accompanying text supra.
145. Casper, supra note 141, at 100.
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of North Carolina, to label the decision in Jones "a glaring ex-
ample of the Court's habit of effecting constitutional revision by
judicial fiat. 14 6 In this "transparent exercise of rewriting his-
tory, 14 7 judicial activism had simply "run riot. ' 14' He main-
tained that the 1866 Act was designed to prohibit state legisla-
tures from discriminatory treatment of citizens and was not
intended to reach private actions;149 it surely could not be con-
strued as an "open occupancy" statute.50 Moreover, he felt that
the Court had distorted the Thirteenth Amendment. Senator
Ervin maintained that the Thirteenth Amendment had been
confined to the simple act of removing the legal fetters that had
held slaves as chattels."'
Without resolving the issue of the balance between judicial
activism and judicial restraint, the arguments developed by the
critics of the Court in Jones, shorn of their pungent rhetoric,
may be summarized briefly. The Thirteenth Amendment
manumitted the slaves by abolishing the legal relationships upon
which slavery rested. Further, the amendment prohibited state-
sanctioned inequalities, the so-called badges and incidents of
slavery, existing or erected after emancipation. Under the Ena-
bling Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress was only
empowered to strike down state-sanctioned discrimination and
to confer equal legal status or capacity on the former slaves,
thus eliminating vestiges of slavery. In the view of these critics,
that is precisely, and solely, what the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was designed to do. Congress cannot reach beyond that constitu-
146. Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L.
REv. 485, 485 (1969).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 502.
149. Id. at 490.
150. Id; at 495-96. Senator Ervin had no doubt that the 1866 Act had been enacted
to protect the right to equal legal status and capacity for the recent former slaves. That,
however, was as far as he felt the 1866 Act went. Id. at 490. "[T]he Court," Senator
Ervin protested, "distorts the plain words of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from their true
meaning in holding that they confer upon a Negro the legal right to compel an unwilling
owner of private property to convey or lease it to him." Id. at 496.
151. Id. at 499-500. "There is not a syllable in the thirteenth amendment which
authorizes Congress to bar private discrimination based on race. . . ." Id. at 500. That
interpretation, Senator Ervin asserted, would impart to the Thirteenth Amendment "a
meaning and purpose wholly unrelated to its history and language." Id. at 499 (footnote
omitted).
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tional limit to regulate private acts of discrimination. The Su-
preme Court cannot now define private discriminatory actions
based on race as badges of slavery without overruling prior deci-
sions which had held that they were not. Hence, the critics of
the Court in Jones argued, the decision was incorrect.
Defenders of the decision in Jones hastened to challenge
this interpretation of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment
and other contentions of the critics. 1 2 Professor Arthur Kinoy
praised the ruling as creating an unlimited potential for making
blacks in America truly equal.153 Conscious of the political im-
pact of the case, he noted that the Court had provided, in the
aftermath of the race riots of Newark, Detroit and Washington,
a means "for the swift and sweeping implementation of the free-
dom long ago promised black men and women. ' 4 The deci-
sion," [a]n historic step forward," recognized at last that the
herding of black people into urban slums was a relic of slav-
ery.155 The Thirteenth Amendment "was a charter of 'universal
freedom' which carried with it the right of the race of freedmen
to be henceforth free from the stamp of inferiority imposed by
the 'badges and indicia' of the institution of human slavery.""
Since the Court in Jones characterized discrimination in housing
as one such "badge" of inferiority, Congress, and indeed every
branch of government, according to Professor Kinoy, now had
an affirmative obligation to "eradicate it from all areas of na-
tional life. '1 57
Another supporter of the Jones Court, commentator Robert
L. Kohl, also addressed the issue of congressional power under
the Thirteenth Amendment.158 He maintained that while eman-
cipation under section 1 of the Amendment invalidated private
152. See note 135 supra and notes 153-68 and accompanying text infra.
153. Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited: Some First
Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 537, 540-43 (1968).
154. Id. at 550.
155. Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: An Historic Step Forward, 22 VAND. L.
REV. 475, 476 (1969). "If the fundamental problems of the black ghettos are in truth
'relics' of the slave system," Professor Kinoy asserted, "they are subject to the full and
plenary power of the national government." Id. at 477.
156. Id. at 477.
157. Id. at 478.
158. Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 273-76 (1969).
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property rights in human chattels, section 1 did not automati-
cally erase the badges of slavery; achievement of this purpose
would require positive action to confer rights under section 2 of
the Amendment, which was designed to destroy the entire infra-
structure of state laws and private actions that supported slav-
ery.1" e The Civil Rights Act of 1866, maintained Kohl, was posi-
tive action in response to private prejudice60 and prohibited,
under the sanction of the Thirteenth Amendment, such discrim-
ination against blacks in the sale of housing."' 1 Kohl argued,
moreover, that the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment had
been inaccurately interpreted to mean that the 1866 Act was in-
corporated into the new Amendment and subject to its "state
action" requirements. 162 Because the Thirteenth Amendment
had already established and assured the constitutionality of the
Act's provisions against private discrimination, any "state ac-
tion" limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment was "irrelevant
to the 1866 Act." '
More recently, Professor G. Sidney Buchanan praised the
Supreme Court in Jones for discovering a "'new' thirteenth
amendment of contemporary scope and relevance," and resur-
recting for it the role intended by its framers."6 After examining
159. Id. at 274-76. Without section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Kohl main-
tained, "a class of effective slaves could exist even though the master-slave relationship
could not." Id. at 275.
160. Id. at 278-83.
161. Id. at 292. Kohl also observed that the Black Codes had in fact conferred
some rights on the freedmen, but that they had also, and primarily, perpetuated some
disabilities. Id. at 277-78. Congress had become aware of this situation. Furthermore, the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction found that the Black Codes told only part of the
story; the South "was covertly attempting to reintroduce a new, privately enforced slave
system." Id. at 279-80. Testimony taken by the Committee, combined with the evidence
in Carl Schurz's REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH, supra, note 61, demonstrated
repeated instances of disabilities, not only under "color of law," but in private relation-
ships between whites and blacks as well. Kohl, supra note 158, at 280.
162. Kohl, supra note 158, at 293-95. Kohl asserted that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment actually strengthened the 1866 Act. Id. at 294.
163. Id. at 293-95.
164. Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment (pt. 6), 12 Hous. L. Rav. 844, 844 (1974-75) (footnote omitted). Professor
Buchanan explained that adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments unin-
tentionally "resulted in a subtle legislative displacement of the thirteenth amendment, a
displacement contributing to the negative reception later accorded to the thirteenth
amendment by the federal judiciary." Id. at 333-34. By the 1870s, as the national mood
had swung away from "vigorous support of Reconstruction legislation in the South to a
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/3
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the debates surrounding the 1865 adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment by the 38th Congress, Professor Buchanan con-
cluded that its proponents intended a dramatic transfer of
power from the states to the national government, granting to
Congress the power to guarantee inalienable rights. ' " He further
concluded that even the opponents of the Amendment shared
the proponents' expectation that Congress, not the states, would
define badges of slavery and, thus, would have the authority to
enforce the abolition of slavery. 166
Professor Buchanan's explication of the Jones decision fol-
lowed and approved the Court's arguments, with one substantial
alteration which reveals the present-minded flavor of his work.
Even if Congressional intent were somewhat ambiguous in re-
gard to the "private action" scope of the 1866 Act (which Pro-
fessor Buchanan claimed it was not), 67 he maintained that the
Jones majority should nevertheless be supported in its construc-
tion of the law precisely because it was useful to give section
1982 a construction which relates to racial conditions in contem-
desire for national reconciliation; . . .Congress became reluctant to use the thirteenth
amendment" to regulate private racial discrimination. Id.at 334.
Emasculated by judicial interpretation in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century,
especially in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which restricted the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment by limiting the extent of congressional power under it, the
Amendment "remained largely submerged" until the Jones decision in 1968. Buchanan,
supra, at 593.
165. Buchanan, supra note 164, at 7-11. According to Professor Buchanan, the
emancipationists had stressed that free blacks, who "bore all the badges and incidents of
slavery save the technical one," would fall under the Thirteenth Amendment's ken. Id.
at 11. This notion, in turn, provided evidence that the task of abolishing slavery was far
more extensive than the simple removal of the status of legal bondage. Id. at 10-11.
Representative Wilson had maintained, for instance, that the Thirteenth Amendment
would not only free the blacks from slavery, but also secure all blacks, bond and free, in
their natural and constitutional rights, and provide legal equality for all American citi-
zens regardless of race. Id. at 12.
166. Id. at 21-22.
167. Id. at 22. Senator Trumbull's remarks, see notes 63-66, 109-15 and accompa-
nying text supra, and note 170 infra, once again were employed to demonstrate that
"[tlhe rights secured by the bill were an 'appropriate' means of safeguarding the individ-
ual liberty decreed by the abolition of slavery." Buchanan, supra note 164, at 18 (quot-
ing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1866)). According to Professor Buchanan,
Senator Trumbull had understood that those rights could be denied by discriminatory
legislation and by "individual action based on custom or prejudice and made possible by
the absence of restraining legislation," although he stressed the latter discrimination less
than "color of law" discrimination. Id. at 19 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
366 (1866)).
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VI. The Need for Historical Reexamination
The search for historical accuracy requires a detached un-
derstanding of one's own cosmological conditioning, an apprecia-
tion of the cosmology of the historical period under evaluation,
and a comprehensive examination of all relevant available his-
torical sources, including primary evidence and the works of his-
torians specializing in the particular period. The pursuit of his-
torical precision in the Reconstruction period requires, on the
part of both Justices and commentators, an examination of
sources well beyond the scope and caliber of the debates printed
in the Congressional Globe.
On close analysis, the historical interpretations employed by
the Justices in both the majority and dissent of the Jones deci-
sion are troublesome. After evaluating the opinions produced by
the intensive and laborious task of extracting juicy quotations
from the congressional debates and by the additional burden of
challenging and refuting the equally juicy quotations selected by
the other side, it is still difficult to have confidence in the Jus-
tices' historical investigations. Indeed, the historical record as
presented by both opinions in the Jones decision is so ambigu-
ous that it is even possible to believe that there were two Sena-
168. Buchanan, supra note 164, at 848. Professor Buchanan stated:
Here, only an economic-equality construction of § 1982 has relevance for the mod-
ern manifestations of racial discrimination. To limit § 1982 to the protection of
the legal capacity to acquire property is to deprive the Act of all functional utility
in today's society. Unless a statute's language and legislative history plainly re-
quire it, a statute should not be construed into practical impotence. If the issue of
construction is in doubt, that construction should be chosen that gives the statute
a continuing vitality. As applied to § 1982, the economic-equality construction of
the Jones majority meets this policy desideratum.
Id. Moreover, Professor Buchanan suggested the badge-of-slavery concept ought to
spearhead a new civil rights thrust. Id. at 850-51. He had discovered in the congressional
debates a hint of "a still more pervasive congressional power - the power to regulate
private acts of discrimination based on factors other than race." Id. at 22. Discrimination
against women, and all other arbitrary class discriminations (such as religion, national
origin, and alienage), might fall under the badge-of-slavery theory. Id. at 852. "Sadly,"
Professor Buchanan observed, "the vision calling forth this expansive concept faded" in
the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. Id. at 22. To Professor Buchanan, the Court
in Jones had played its part; Congress must now bring to fruition the vision of those who
had enacted the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 850-51.
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tor Trumbulls!16'9
Any assessment of the attitudes, intentions and motives of a
body as diverse as the United States Congress, with its mem-
bers' multiple interests, ideological positions and complex per-
sonalities, must rest on an analysis of more than a few state-
ments by a handful of its members, even those of its
acknowledged leaders. This is especially true when the period
under historical examination is one involving severe political un-
rest. Since the decision in Jones turns as surely on historical in-
terpretation as upon legal reasoning, one wonders why the na-
tion's highest tribunal did not examine the available works of
scholars specializing in the period of Reconstruction. 17° The fail-
ure of the Justices to consult such authorities deprived the
Court of a body of information and certain analytical techniques
which might have proved invaluable. While the majority'71 and
dissenting172 opinions did cite some historical treatises, the effort
169. For a presentation of the seemingly contradictory statements of Senator
Lyman Trumbull, see notes 63-66, 109-15 and accompanying text supra, and note 170
infra.
170. By 1968, an outpouring of historical literature, beginning in roughly 1960, had
significantly altered historians' attitudes about Reconstruction. Works of historiography
that describe the shifting patterns of historical interpretation of Reconstruction include:
Hyman, Introduction, to THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1861-1870, at
xvii (1967); Weisberger, The Dark and Bloody Ground of Reconstruction Historiogra-
phy, 25 J.S. HisT. 427 (1959); Wharton, Reconstruction, in WRITING SOUTHERN HISTORY
295 (A. Link & R. Patrick eds. 1965).
Substantial works of historical scholarship which bear directly on the issue of the
motives of the Republicans during Reconstruction include: W. R. BROCK, AN AMERCAN
CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1867 (1963); F. BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS:
SCOURGE OF THE SOUTH (1959); L. Cox & J. Cox, POLrICS, PRINCIPLE, AND PREJUDICE,
1865-1866; DnmEMMA OF RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (1963); G. FREDRICKSON, THE INNER
CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION (1965); E. McKrr-
RICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960); J. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1964);
D. MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862-1872
(1967); K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965); H. TREFOUSSE, BEN-
JAMIN FRANKLIN WADE: RADICAL REPUBLICAN FROM OHIO (1963).
It is particularly interesting to note that neither the majority nor the dissent in
Jones cited the excellent biography of Senator Lyman Trumbull by M. Krug, supra note
63.
For recent studies on major issues of Reconstruction, see note 178 infra.
171. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 426 n. 34, 427 n. 36, 428 nn. 40 & 41,
429 n. 46, 435 n. 70, 436 n. 72 (1968).
172. Id. at 460 n. 24, 473 nn. 54 & 55, 474 nn. 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 & 61, 475 nn. 62 &
63, 476 n. 66 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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appears to have been designed to provide confirmation for con-
clusions previously reached, rather than as part of a genuine
search for empirical evidence to inform inquiring minds. Both
the sources cited and the citations themselves, moreover, are fre-
quently so general that they would not pass muster in any re-
spectable graduate history seminar. 17- Some references are to
college-level textbooks. 17 4
By failing to consult any historian whose expertise lies in
the area of appreciation of historical context, the Justices left
themselves bereft of the sword and shield of historiographical
awareness. Such sensitivity might have assisted them in screen-
ing out twentieth century views, distinguishing between current
cosmology and that of the past. Historical interpretation, com-
plex at best and tortuous at worst, is rendered even more diffi-
cult when essayed within limited historical horizons. It is at this
juncture that "playing tricks on the dead" becomes a dangerous
possibility.
Commentators on either side of the Jones decision have cast
considerable light into the crevices where the legal ramifications
of the issues lie hidden. The commentators, like the Justices,
however, may also be criticized for attempting historical analysis
of legislative intent without adequate historical information or
for inventing the past as they would prefer it to have occurred.
The role of interpreter or critic does not automatically emanci-
pate the legal scholar from the cosmological influences that af-
fect the Justices themselves. A commentator is necessarily a
product of his training, his philosophy, and the impact of events.
It is regrettable that, in regard to the Jones case, legal scholars
may have succumbed too frequently to the compulsions of pre-
sent-mindedness inherent in those influences. Each commenta-
tor who attempts to foray into the past and to draw instruction
from the actors in the drama of Reconstruction is doomed to
misread that past if he falls to distinguish his own cosmology
from that of the members of the 39th Congress in 1866.
The treatment in the preceding pages of the deliberations of
173. See, e.g., id. at 436 n. 72; id. at 473 n. 54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
174. See, e.g., id. at 426 n. 34 (citing S. MORISON & H. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (4TH ED. 1950)).
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these legal scholars 17 5 results from an awareness of the com-
manding influence legal scholars have over the American legal
community. Access to the legal journals places these writers in
the crucial role of filtering complex court decisions to busy prac-
titioners who, one might assume, often seek such expertise as
guidance through the forests of opinions and holdings. The
power to affect profoundly the thinking of the legal profession
creates an awesome responsibility for these academics. Their ob-
ligation to achieve historical accuracy, insofar as that elusive en-
tity is attainable, may indeed be greater even than that of the
bench, for theirs is the business of scholarship. Their formidable
legal erudition does not absolve them from playing their own
tricks on the dead.
This historian remains unpersuaded that the shadowy ques-
tions about the motives of the 39th Congress in 1866 have been
answered, and unconvinced that the historical analysis by the
Justices or the commentators, upon which the Jones case ulti-
mately turns, has been sufficiently exacting. Whether the Thir-
teenth Amendment was a resounding declaration of human free-
dom or a limited legal manumission from bondage remains an
open question. Whether the Enabling Clause of that Amend-
ment provided Congress with power to define and eliminate all
badges and incidents of slavery, or restricted that power to nulli-
fying discriminatory state laws, similarly has not yet been de-
cided. Did the 39th Congress understand the Civil Rights Act of
1866 as a "comprehensive statute forbidding all racial discrimi-
nation affecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the Act, ''17 6
or rather as a law which "was intended to apply only to state-
sanctioned conduct and not to purely private action"? 177 Was
the Fourteenth Amendment designed to widen or narrow the
scope of the 1866 Act, or was it irrelevant to the 1866 Act?
The purview of an historical dimension may assist in clari-
fying some of the ambiguities and contradictions arising from
the Jones decision and the attendant literature. In the absence
of any serious historical treatment, one is compelled to make the
choice of believing the majority or the dissent in Jones, or one
175. See notes 134-68 and accompanying text supra.
176. 392 U.S. at 435.
177. Id. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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commentator or another, by virtue of one's own contemporary
ideological tastes and social philosophies. By placing juxtaposed
elements into a larger framework or synthesis, historical analysis
may permit reconciliation of some contrary ideas and may foster
appreciation of continuities where previously only conflicts ap-
peared. What is required is a definitive and systematic reinter-
pretation of Reconstruction policy. Volumes of analysis of pri-
mary evidence would be necessary to accomplish that task
thoroughly.178 In this brief work only an excursion into the terri-
tory of historical assessment may be attempted. -Nonetheless,
some general observations may be advanced.
VII. An Historical Examination of Reconstruction
A. Reconstruction and National Order: An Historical
Overview
At the outset it is critical to appreciate that the year 1866 is
not frozen in time. The events of that crucial year cannot be
isolated and captured as in a still photograph. They were an in-
separable link in a sequence of occurrences that for thirty years
pitted North and South in bitter combat over policies, values,
and institutions of the United States. Although the seeds of sec-
178. A number of recent studies indicate that the major issues of Reconstruction
are being re-examined. See H. BELz, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
AND FREEDMEN'S RIGHTS, 1861-1866 (1976); H. BELZ, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS
(1978); M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RE-
CONSTRUCTION 1863-1869 (1974); W. GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 1869-
1879 (1979); H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1973); L. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG:
THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY (1979); P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTI-
TUTION, LAW AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1975); M. PERMAN, REUNION WITHOUT
COMPROMISE: THE SOUTH AND RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1868 (1973); RADICAL REPUBLICANS
IN THE NORTH: STATE POLITICS DURING RECONSTRUCTION (J. Mohr ed. 1976); J. RAWLEY,
THE POLITICS OF UNION (1974); P. RIDDLEBERGER, 1866: THE CRITICAL YEAR REVISITED
(1979); C. VANN WOODWARD, AMERICAN COUNTERPOINT, SLAVERY AND RACISM IN THE
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE (1971); Gerber, The Liberal Republicans of 1872 in Histori-
ographical Perspective, 62 J. AM. HIST. 40 (1975); Kincaid, Victims of Circumstance: An
Interpretation of Changing Attitudes Toward Republican Policy Makers and Recon-
struction, 57 J. AM. HIST. 48 (1970).
On the major issues of the pre-war period, see D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT
CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978); E. FoNER, FREE SoIL, FREE
LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
(1970); M. HOLT, THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE 1850s (1978).
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tional conflict lay deep in the soil of America's past, they burst
into full bloom in 1848 following the acquisition of large territo-
ries from Mexico, at which time the issue of extension of slavery
into all the American territories became the preeminent national
concern.'79 The 1850s witnessed an uninterrupted showdown in
which each event in an unfolding drama polarized the nation,
freezing existing sectional differences into irreconcilable emo-
tional, political, and ideological divisions. 80 The bloodiest war in
all of the Nineteenth Century ensued.
After 600,000 deaths and nearly two million total casual-
ties,18 the Union emerged triumphant, but the hatred and bit-
terness were not expiated by the silence of the guns. In the wake
of victory, the enormous responsibilities for restoring, not only
the physical and economic structures of the nation but also its
spiritual and ideological resources, were thrust upon the 39th
Congress and President Andrew Johnson. That restoration -
Reconstruction - intensely consumed the daily consciousness of
the nation from the time of Appomattox in 1865 until the Radi-
cal Republicans satisfied themselves that the 'former rebel states
should return to full status in the Union. 8 2 That process was
not fully completed until the final withdrawal of federal troops
from the South in 1877.8 The events of 1866, therefore, are ex-
plicable and understandable only as part of the patterns of an
entire generation's struggle and may not be separated from them
without "playing tricks on the dead."
Viewing the year 1866 in this light enhances awareness of
179. See H. HAMLTON, PROLOGUE TO CONFLICT (1964); R. JOHANNSEN, FRONTIER
PoLrTcs ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1955); A. NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION, (1947);
D. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CIsIs 1848-1861 (1976); J. RAWLEY, RACE AND POLITICS:
"BLEEDING KANSAS" AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1969); J. RAYBACK, FREE SOEL:
THE ELECTION oF 1848 (1970).
180. For discussion of the polarization and escalation of sectional differences, see
A. CRAVEN, THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (2d ed. 1957); K. STAMPP, AND THE WAR
CAME: THE NORTH AND THE SECESSION CRISIS 1860-1861 (1950); W. TAYLOR, CAVALIER AND
YANKEE THE OLD SOUTH AND AMERICAN NATIONAL CHARACTER (1961).
181. J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 521 (2d ed.
1961).
182. See note 192 and accompanying text infra.
183. For material on the completion of the Reconstruction process, see K. POLA-
KOFF, THE POLITICS OF INERTIA: THE ELECTION OF 1876 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION
(1973); C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE
END OF RECONSTRUCTION (2d ed. 1956).
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Reconstruction as a continuation of what many have considered
"an irrepressible conflict."'' " Hostile systems of belief and be-
havior could not be reconciled before the war. The experience of
that conflagration further embittered the combatants; the con-
flict was simply transferred to the post-war arena. A struggle en-
sued between the efforts of the victorious Union to impose its
wartime objectives on the physically prostrate South, and the
corresponding efforts by the spiritually unconquered rebels to
protect their cultural heritage against obliteration. In short, Re-
construction was a continuing conflict between northern war
aims and southern culture.
The task of reconstructing the South was immense. 18 5 Rees-
tablishment of a sense of order in the South, the most immedi-
ate requirement, meant that the routines of peacetime had to be
resumed, reliable services and trade relations restored, obedi-
ence to law reinstated, and lawless bands suppressed. Economic
and fiscal chaos had to end. The South had to be reconnected to
a national system of enterprise. Cotton had to be planted and
cattle fattened. A new system of labor had to be devised, for
slavery had been a war casualty. Railroads had to be rebuilt and
shipping restored. Roads and public buildings had to be erected
out of bombed-out devastation, and private construction had to
be undertaken to restore homes, businesses, and the fertility of
184. For discussion of the notion of irrepressibility, see THE CAUSES OF THE AMRi-
CAN CIVIL WAR (E. Rozwenc ed. 1961); A. COLE, THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT 1850-1865
(1934); T. PRESSLY, AMERICANS INTERPRET THEIR CIVIL WAR (1954). For an alternative
view, see Randall, The Blundering Generation, 27 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 3 (1940).
185. For primary materials depicting the condition of the South at the conclusion
of the Civil War, see S. ANDREWS, THE SOUTH SINCE THE WAR (1866); A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, v. 6, at 300-708; v. 7, at 6-220
(J. Richardson ed. 1907) [hereinafter cited as MESSAGES AND PAPERS]; J. DENNETT, THE
SOUTH As IT Is; 1865-1866 (1965); J. DE FOREST, A UNION OFFICER IN THE RECONSTRUC-
TON (1948); W. REID, AFTER THE WAR, A TOUR OF THE SOUTHERN STATES 1865-1866
(1866); C. SCHURZ, REPORT, supra note 61; J. TROWBRIDGE, THE SOUTH: A TOUR OF ITS
BATTLEFIELDS AND RUINED CITIES (1866).
For recent historical works on the condition of the South at the conclusion of the
Civil War, see E. NATHANS, LOSING THE PEACE: GEORGIA REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUC-
TION, 1865-1871 (1968); 0. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION WINE-
GAR TOURGEE (1965); R. RANSOM & R. SUTCH, ONE KIND OF FREEDOM: THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF EMANCIPATION (1977); W. ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION: THE
PORT ROYAL EXPERIMENT (1964); J. SHOFNER, NOR IS IT OVER YET: FLORIDA IN THE ERA OF
RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1877 (1974); J. WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN
SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1877 (1965).
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the land. Schools and churches, indeed all institutions, had to be
reestablished. Civil government had to be renewed. A revised so-
cial system, based on new relationships between the races, had
similarly to be erected. Of course, the relationship of the south-
ern states to the Union had to be determined. And, perhaps
most crucially, a new direction, a new sense of spiritual vitality,
had to be engendered for a people who had considered them-
selves, even for a brief moment in history, as a separate and in-
dependent nation.
Conditions, however, were hardly propitious for the success
of this process of rebuilding, rebirth, and renewal. With every
fiber of its strength, the South had willed itself to resist the
spirit, if not the forms, of even that most mild version of Recon-
struction originally proposed by Presidents Lincoln and John-
son.186 After the Civil War, while the southern governments du-
tifully abolished slavery, they wilfully passed the Black Codes. 8 7
To represent these restored states in Washington, Southerners
elected to office the very civil and military personnel who had
governed those states under the Confederate banner. 88 The
South may have been responding naturally to the trauma of dis-
order and fear of the unknown by clinging to the security and
comfort of traditional practices. Northerners, however, viewed
such southern actions, whatever the psychology or the legal
technicalities, as evidence of continuing disloyalty to the United
186. For primary works that portray southern attitudes toward Reconstruction, see
REPORT OF BENJAMIN C. TRUMAN, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 43, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1866);
Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to Andrew Johnson (Dec. 18, 1865), reprinted in S. ExEc.
Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1865); Henry M. Watterson to Andrew Johnson,
Dispatch No. 10, (Oct. 30, 1865) (Johnson MSS, Library of Congress). For recent histori-
cal works that portray southern attitudes toward Reconstruction, see M. ABBOTT, THE
FREEDMEN'S BUREAU IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1865-1872 (1967); M. PERMAN, supra note 178;
H. WHITE, THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU IN LOUISIANA (1970).
For Abraham Lincoln's position on Reconstruction, see W. HESSELTINE, LINCOLN'S
PLAN OF RECONSTRUCTION (1960); W. WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 250 (43d ed. Boston 1871) (1st ed. Boston 1862).
187. See note 60 supra.
188. Those elected included five Confederate generals, four Confederate colonels,
six Confederate cabinet officers, fifty-eight Confederate congressmen, and even the Vice-
President of the Confederacy, Alexander Stephens of Georgia. These were men whom
several months earlier it had been permissible to shoot on sight. See W. HESSELTINE,
CONFEDERATE LEADERS IN THE NEW SOUTH 93-147 (1950).
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The Union was badly fractured over the course that Recon-
struction should take. Arguments about the goals and methods
of rebuilding the South filled households, state-houses, and the
39th Congress. While all agreed that evidence of renewed south-
ern loyalty to the Union was of the uppermost importance, disa-
greement arose as to what proof of genuine fealty was necessary.
Positions ran the gamut.190 Those conservatives who backed the
lenient view of the President believed that a simple oath to up-
hold the Constitution should be accompanied by an immediate
withdrawal of troops and full reinstatement of the rights of
southern states and citizens.191 Some Radicals, on the other
hand, wished to cripple permanently the power of the southern
leadership structure, to punish certain classes of officials, and to
distribute southern lands to the freedmen. 192
189. See notes 197-98 and accompanying text infra.
190. Identification of various types of Republicans is a tortuous enterprise. In gen-
eral terms, Radical Republicans may be distinguished from their more numerous Repub-
lican confreres by the degree to which they were willing to support black equality and to
utilize military rule and stringent conditions for the readmission of former rebel states to
the Union to achieve it. Conservative Republicans tended to support presidential Recon-
struction policies. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 178, at 21-58.
For discussion of the political positions of the 39th Congress, see notes 211 & 239
infra.
191. For conservative Republican views backing the lenient position of the Presi-
dent, see Valedictory Address [to the Massachusetts Legislature] by Governor Andrew
(Jan. 4, 1866), reprinted in 1 DocuMENTARv HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 156-58 (W.
Fleming ed. 1906); Letter from Representative John H. DeFrees to Senator James R.
Doolittle, reprinted in 11 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN HISTORICAL ASsOcIATION 104-
05 (1907); Speech by Abraham Lincoln (Apr. 11, 1865), reprinted in 8 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (R. Basler ed. 1953). See also AMERICAN FREEDMEN'S IN-
QUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT (1864), reprinted in THE WAR OF THE REBELLION, Ser.
3, vol. 4, at 289, 381-82 (1864).
Such lenient positions toward the South are sympathetically noted in A. CRAVEN,
RECONSTRUCTION: THE ENDING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1969) and R. WINSTON, ANDREW JOHN-
SON, PLEBEIAN AND PATRIOT (1928).
192. For primary works which express Radical Republican views, see Wade-Davis
bill, H.R. 244, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1864), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HIS-
TORY at 436-39 (8th ed. H. Commager ed. 1968); Grosvenor, The Law of Conquest the
True Basis of Reconstruction, 24 NEW ENGLANDER 111 (1865); Julian, Radicalism and
Conservatism - Truth of History Vindicated, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. app.
65-68 (1865) (Speech in House of Representatives, Feb. 7, 1865).
For secondary works in which Radical Republican attitudes are treated, see D. DON-
ALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1970); H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL
REPUBLICANS (1968).
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Many Northerners held views which cannot be categorized
as either Radical or conservative. For so many Northerners who
had lost a father, a husband, or a son, the thirst for vengeance
could be slaked only by absolute evidence of southern repen-
tance and remorse. For others, an additional objective existed:
northern values - embodied in those precious institutions of
private enterprise, individualism, public education, religious up-
lift, self-help, and Yankee morality - needed to be engrafted on
the South. The prior reliance on slave power had impeded insti-
tutional uniformity and even business expansion in the same
way that it had blocked the ideas of freedom and democracy.
For those, evidence that the South had actually accepted Yan-
kee values and institutions would be required before the north-
ern grip on the South was relaxed. For still others, the welfare of
the freedmen was of paramount concern.
Northern views on Reconstruction were numerous and di-
verse and, adding to the confusion, similar views were often
based on divergent presuppositions. One need not have been an
abolitionist to believe that slavery was an evil, nor was it neces-
sary for one to have accepted the notion of social equality to
think that decent treatment of oppressed minorities should be a
national objective. s
These divisions in northern thinking were reflected in the
jurisdictional dispute between the President and Congress over
the constitutional issue of the responsibility for Reconstruc-
tion.194 Based on the theory that the Civil War-had been a giant
insurrection of disloyal persons and that the southern states
193. For discussion of the complicated relationship between racial attitudes and
desires to end slavery and to uplift the freedmen, see E. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER
AGAINST SLAVERY (1967); FLAWED VICTORY, A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE CIVIL WAR (W.
Barney ed. 1975); S. OATES, WrH MALICE TOWARD NONE: THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
(1977); RECONSTRUCTION, AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS (K. Stampp & L.
Litwack eds. 1969); Cox & Cox, Negro Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of
Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography, 33 J. S. HIST. 303 (1967).
194. For primary works which discuss the question of jurisdiction over Reconstruc-
tion, see REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-21
(1866) (views of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens); Andrew Johnson, Message to Congress (Dec. 4,
1865), reprinted in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 185, at 353; Abraham Lincoln,
Proclamation (Dec. 8, 1863), reprinted in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 185, at
213 (commonly known as "Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction"). For major
secondary works that cover this issue, see H. HYMAN, supra note 178; J. RANDALL, CON-
STITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1964).
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themselves had never left the Union, President Johnson had
used his constitutional power to pardon former rebels195 and to
set only mild conditions for the political reunion of the states.196
A restive 39th Congress, on the other hand, dissatisfied with the
President's leniency and aroused by what it perceived as south-
ern recalcitrance, was determined to reestablish, after a season
of executive dominance, its traditional role as the premier
branch of government. Relying on its constitutional mandate to
provide for each state "a republican form of government,'
'9 7
Congress uprooted the President's Reconstruction plan, estab-
lished military supervision, and required the southern states to
fulfill certain conditions, such as ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment and, in some cases, the Fifteenth Amendment as
well. 199
The dynamic of change, so obvious in the political and so-
cial arena, was paralleled by a substantial shift in American
thought from the pre-war to the post-war years. 99 The Civil
War had depleted the pre-war spirit of individualism and hu-
manitarian reform, supplanting it with a sense of national com-
munity. Perhaps the mightiest spearhead of influence in the
ante-bellum cosmology had been the movement, associated with
Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, for humani-
tarian individualism.2 00 Based on a belief in the sacred character
195. Andrew Johnson, Proclamation (May 29, 1865), reprinted in 6 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 185, at 310.
196. Andrew Johnson, Proclamation (May 29, 1865), reprinted in 6 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 185, at 312.
197. Section 4 of Article 4 of the United States Constitution provides: "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government
.... U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
198. For discussion of the introduction of military rule in the South, see D. DON-
ALD, supra note 192, 218-320; J. SEFTON, THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND RECONSTRUC-
TION 1865-1877 (1967); G. VAN DEUSEN, WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD 418-85 (1967). For dis-
cussion of the ratification of the post-war amendments, see W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIrEENTRH AMENDMENT (1965); J. JAMES, THE
FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956).
199. For examples of the ways in which ideas of policy makers shifted, see W. GIL-
LETrE, supra note 178; Gerber, Liberal Republicanism, Reconstruction, and Social Or-
der: Samuel Bowles as a Test Case, 45 NEW ENGLAND Q. 393 (1972); Gerber, Edwin L.
Godkin Discovers America, 5 ROCKY MTN. Soc. SC. J. 13 (1968).
200. Historians have written profusely about individualism, the ante-bellum reform
movements, and their major figures. See generally L. RATNER, PRE-CIVIL WAR REFORM
(1967); T. SMITH, REVIVALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM: AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM ON THE EvE
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and divine nature of man, this movement sought to liberate the
individual spirit from the restraints of social customs, traditional
institutions, and even self-imposed inhibitions. Humane and
sentimental, emotionally and spiritually committed to human
freedom and dignity, this anti-establishment, anti-institutional
ferment spawned various species of reform whose common
theme was best characterized by Walt Whitman's statement,
"Whoever degrades another, degrades me." 0' 1 Causes embraced
by humanitarian reformers ranged from pacifism to prohibition,
from elimination of debtor's prisons to vegetarianism, from wo-
men's rights to the anti-slavery crusade.20 In a Dorothea Dix,
this reform was embodied as a selfless devotion to the conditions
of men and women chained in asylums.20 In a William Lloyd
Garrison or a Wendell Phillips,20 ' this reform became a radi-
cal, anarchic impulse, contemptuous of American government
for licensing slavery and resolved at whatever cost to liberate the
victims of the oppressor's lash.
The Civil War brought to a peak this combination of warm-
hearted reform and defiant individualism. Abolitionists, particu-
larly, envisioned the war as a heaven-sent opportunity to purge
America of its single greatest sin against humanity.206 The war
OF THE CIVIL WAR (1957); A. TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT: PHASES OF AMERICAN SOCIAL
HISTORY FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR (1944).
201. W. WHITMAN, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS 44 (S. Bradley ed. 1957)
(1st ed. Brooklyn, N.Y. 1855).
202. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, New England Reformers (Lecture of Mar. 3, 1844),
in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 449 (B. At-
kinson ed. 1950); H. GREELEY, RECOLLECTIONS OF A BuSY LIFE 497-527 (1868).
203. Dorothea Dix, Memorial on the Condition of the Insane in Massachusetts
(Speech in Boston, Jan. 1843), reprinted in THE ERA OF REFORM 1830-1860 at 165-70 (H.
Commager ed. 1960).
204. See W. P. GARRISON, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, 1805-1879: THE STORY OF HIS
LIFE TOLD BY HIS CHILDREN (1885-89).
205. Speech by Wendell Phillips to the Massachusetts Antislavery Society, Boston
(Jan. 27, 1853), reprinted in WENDELL PHILLIPS ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND FREEDOM 28 (L.
Filler ed. 1965).
206. For primary works demonstrating abolitionist support for the Civil War, see
WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 63-66 (G. Fredrickson ed. 1968) (extracts from speeches by
Garrison); Speech by Wendell Phillips (Apr. 21, 1861), reprinted in N.Y. Times, Apr. 28,
1861; Letter from Gerrit Smith to William Lloyd Garrison (Sept. 2, 1861) (Garrison
MSS, Boston Public Library).
For studies of abolitionists and the Civil War, see R. NYE, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON
AND THE HUMANITARIAN REFORMERS (1955); G. SORIN, ABOLITIONISM: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
(1972); J. STEWART, HOLY WARRIORS, THE ABOLITIONISTS AND AMERICAN SLAVERY (1976).
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became the vehicle by which individuals, blacks and whites,
would be emancipated from the fetters of slavery and aristoc-
racy. The war provided abolitionists with the opportunity to up-
lift humanity and make all men free.
Throughout the Civil War and Reconstruction years, advo-
cates of humanitarian individualism had many occasions to
rejoice. 01 The Emancipation Proclamation, the Freedmen's Bu-
reau Act, 0 8 the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the firm Reconstruction
policies toward the South brought hopes of fulfillment of the
dreams and objectives for which they had struggled for so many
years. Humanitarian reformers thought that they had lived to
see many of their precious ideals executed through the crucible
of war and its aftermath. More importantly, they believed that
the significant democratizing achievements of the 1860s had in-
deed meant victories for humanitarian individualism, for egali-
tarianism, and for natural rights.
The reformers were seriously mistaken, however, about the
attitudes with which those war-time and post-war measures had
been adopted. Congress certainly had expanded dramatically the
concept of liberty and equality. The generating force for this ex-
pansion, however, was not the spirit of pre-war reform. While
the rhetorical flamboyance. of the anti-slavery vanguard still
echoed in congressional chambers, it is clear, perhaps only with
hindsight, that the anti-establishment impulses of the ante-bel-
lum. p-riod had become outmoded.20 9 The nation had turned a
sharp cosmological corner. Nationalism, not humanitarianism,
explains the momentous policies of Congress during
For studies of the abolitionist movement before the Civil War, see ABOLITION AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE ERA OF REFORM (L. Filler ed. 1972); THE ANTISLAVERY VANGUARD:
NEw ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITIONISTS (M. Duberman ed. 1965); G. BARNES, THE ANTISLAV-
ERY IMPULSE 1830-1844 (1933); L. FILLER, THE CRUSADE AGAINST SLAVERY 1830-1860
(1960).
207. See generally J. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS
AND THE NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1964).
208. Freedmen's Bureau Act, supra note 98.
209. See, e.g., E. E. HALE, FUTURE CIVILIZATION OF THE SOUTH (Boston n.d.); G.
Julian, Dangers and Duties of the Hour - Reconstruction and Suffrage (Speech to the
Indiana Legislature, Nov. 17, 1865), reprinted in SPEECHES ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS 262
(1872); W. Phillips, What We Ask of Congress (Speech), reprinted in Boston Common-
wealth, Dec. 4, 1869, at 2, col. 2.
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Reconstruction.210
B. Reconstruction and National Order: Congressional Intent
Just as the events of Reconstruction were not static, the re-
actions to them were also fluid - dynamic responses by practi-
cal men to real problems. As circumstances evolved from the
pre-war crises to the war-time collision, and from the war-time
collision to the post-war chaos, the thoughts, values, and behav-
ior of the men who served in the 39th Congress had altered cor-
respondingly. Their political stances in 1866 were but momen-
tary resting places amid continuous shifts of positions. These
legislators found themselves, at any particular moment, in a
shifting set of alliances, realignments, and coalitions which
neither began nor ended in 1866.
The 39th Congress had been elected as a war-time coalition
of moderate Republicans and pro-Union Democrats, with a
sprinkling of Radical Republicans.21 Elected in the autumn of
1864, in the same canvass which sent President Lincoln back to
the White House for a second term, the members of the 39th
Congress evinced no particular interest in the measures that dis-
tinguished the ensuing Radical Republican 40th Congress,
elected in the fall of 1866, such as land reform, free public edu-
210. See notes 224-40 and accompanying text infra.
211. The 39th Congress itself was badly split. Analysis of the voting records of the
members of the 38th and 39th Congresses suggests that the political parties were so
badly splintered that delineation of consistent political positions is virtually impossible.
Ideology, social background and motivation all fail to explain why members voted as
they did. It may be concluded that the only pattern that can be discerned was a desire to
get reelected. D. DONALD, THE POLMICS OF REcONSTRUCTION 1863-1867, at 1-25 (1965). It
might reasonably be added that if the 39th Congress reflected what they perceived to be
the peculiar characteristics of their constituents, then the divisions in Congress mirrored
the lack of agreement in the northern populace at large.
An alternate analysis, based on extensive research into congressional documents and
private manuscript materials, has resulted in the construction of a sliding scale describ-
ing the salient features of each political position, from the most extreme radical to the
most conservative, taken by members of the 38th, 39th and 40th Congresses. In the Sen-
ate of the 39th Congress alone, the categories listed are: Conservative Democrats, Moder-
ate Democrats, Johnson Democrats, Extreme Conservative Republicans, Conservative
Republicans, Conservative Centrist Republicans, Radical Centrist Republicans, Radical
Republicans, Extreme Radical Republicans, and a grouping of several individuals, in-
cluding Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, who, not surprisingly, could not be located
consistently anywhere on the scale. M. BENEDICT, supra note 178, at 351-53.
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cation in the South, and black suffrage. 12 Most members of the
39th Congress had no special concern for racial equality, but
rather possessed the northern, white middle-class attitudes to-
ward blacks, common to the entire mid-Nineteenth Century.2
Yet, it was precisely this moderate 39th Congress, Lincoln's
Congress, which enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ennobled
the quality of freedom by proposing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and, suspicious of southern defiance and disloyalty, paved
the way for further liberal enactments by establishing military
rule in the South by the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867.14
212. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 178; D. DONALD, supra note 211.
213. As late as 1859, Senator Trumbull expressed sentiments favoring colonization
of blacks, both as a permanent solution to the problems of race relations in America, and
as a means of eradicating the root of sectional hostilities. "Let us obtain a country nearer
home [than Africa] .... " he argued, "and to show the sympathy of the North for the
South, . . . we will contribute liberally of our means to relieve the country of the free
negro population, and of all slaves who may be voluntarily emancipated, by planting
them in some contiguous country by themselves." CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 61
(1859). See also CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40, 58-59, 102 (1860).
As late as 1862, Senator Jacob M. Howard, Radical Republican from Michigan, re-
ferred to blacks as "wool" to be gathered and sent to Canada. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1780 (1862). In 1864, however, Senator Howard did support the Thirteenth
Amendment and stated that "all men were created equal before their Maker, and that
they ought to be treated as equals before the law." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. at
823 (1864).
Representative Francis P. Blair, Jr., of Missouri, and his brother, United States
Postmaster General Montgomery Blair of Maryland, along with Senator James R. Doo-
little of Wisconsin, favored a Republican sponsored colonization project in Central
America. Montgomery Blair had claimed that such a proposal would quiet the anxieties
of whites who feared that the Republicans wanted to turn the blacks loose on whites. For
Representative Blair's remarks upon introducing the measure into the House, see CONG.
GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 293-98 (1858).
For secondary works which discuss northern attitudes toward blacks, see E.
BERWANGER, supra note 193; F. BONADIO, NORTH OF RECONSTRUCTION, OHIO PoLrrICS,
1865-1870 (1970); G. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE
ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY 1817-1914 (1971); L. LITWACK, NORTH OF
SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 (1961); RADICALISM, RACISM, AND
PARTY REALIGNMENT: THE BORDER STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION (R. Curry ed. 1969);
V. VOEGELI, FREE BUT NOT EQUAL, THE MIDWEST AND THE NEGRO DURING THE CIVIL WAR
(1967).
214. The Reconstruction Act of 1867 divided the seceded states (Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia), except Tennessee which had been accepted back into the Union in
1866, into five military districts. An Act to provide for the more efficient Government of
the Rebel States, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867) [hereinafter cited as Reconstruction Act of
1867]. Each district was under the command of a major general whose duties included
initiation of steps to establish permanent civil governments based on equal treatment of
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What were the objectives of the 39th Congress? What ideology
could reconcile the attitude of coolness toward southern plead-
ings for rapid reunion on lenient terms with equal coolness to-
ward the fiery perorations of humanitarian reformers and Radi-
cals? Why would men with a certain racial intolerance215 enact
and enforce the ideal of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that all
citizens should enjoy equal "rights" to "inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property"?216
The commitment to a strong national government, and to
the requirements of nationalism as grounded in the war-time
emergency, had become the dominant imperatives of the latter
1860s.2 17 The Civil War had engendered a new respect for the
positive state, an attitude in direct conflict with the anti-institu-
tional premises of pre-war humanitarianism. The consolidating
tendencies of the war-time Lincoln administration had been
largely approved.218 The economic concentrations of power nec-
essary to rebuild industry in the post-war years postulated sacri-
fice and cooperation among individuals for the benefit of the na-
tion.219 The great moral energy that had produced the
movement for unlimited individualism had been transformed
into a spiritual drive for national union.
The mission of the 39th Congress, faced with this new na-
tional attitude favoring a centralized national union and with
the responsibility for confronting the complex obligations of vic-
all citizens. Id.
For a standard, but now dated, historical work on the Reconstruction Acts, see J.
GARNER, RECONSTRUCTION IN MISSISSIPPI, 156-85 (1901). For recent historical works, see
M. BENEDICT, THE FRUITS OF VICTORY: ALTERNATIVES IN RESTORING THE UNION 1865-1877,
28-56 (1975); A. CONWAY, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GEORGIA 136-215 (1966); F. WOOD,
THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1867, 25-63 (1975).
215. See note 213 supra.
216. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, supra note 38.
217. G. FREDRICKSON, supra note 170, at 183-238.
218. See H. BEALE, THE CRITICAL YEAR: A STUDY OF ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECON-
STRUCTION (1930); H. BELz, RECONSTRUCTING THE UNION: THEORY AND POLICY DURING THE
CIVIL WAR, 126-311 (1969); L. CURRY, BLUEPRINT FOR MODERN AMERICA (1968); E. FITE,
SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS IN THE NORTH DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1910); LIN-
COLN AND CIVIL WAR POLITICS (J. Rawley ed. 1969); T. WILLIAMS, LINCOLN AND His
GENERALS (1952); T. WILLIAMS, LINCOLN AND THE RADICALS (1941).
219. See A. CARNEGIE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 93-136 (1920); R. HEILBRONER, THE Eco-
NOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 49-85 (1977); Coben, Northeastern Businessmen
and Radical Reconstruction: A Reexamination, 46 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 67 (1959).
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tory, was the invention and implementation of a new social or-
der in the fallen South. To attribute, as the majority in Jones
seems to do,220 to this Congress the humanitarian motives which,
even a year earlier, had activated the anti-slavery forces, misses
the mark. To assume that Congress, in 1866, possessed the lais-
sez-faire mental outlook of the latter part of the Nineteenth
Century,22' as the dissent implies,2 2 goes even further afield. A
Congress inspired by the idea of Union, or reunion, by a national
drive for social cohesion and uniform order, could not simultane-
ously have been driven by the goal of natural rights, or by the
spirit of democratic egalitarianism, or by the desire for historical
justice for the former slaves, or by mass guilt, or by any of the
other pre-war sentiments of reform. While Congressmen had not
entirely abandoned their former precepts, these sentiments,
which certainly abound in the rhetoric of 1865 and 1866,2 were
no longer the dominating influences in the 39th Congress. Ora-
tory in the absence of context is misleading. The dead also play
tricks.
The hypothesis that the Republican majority in the 39th
Congress, including the Radical members, sought above all to
impose upon the post-war chaos their specific version of a uni-
form social order, can be substantially supported.224 Establish-
220. See notes 61-68 and accompanying text supra.
221. See S. FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF
CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 1865-1901 (1956); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND
THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH 1887-1895 (1960).
222. See notes 119-22 and accompanying text supra.
223. See, e.g., Speech by Thaddeus Stevens, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2459-60 (1866). See also G. BOUTWELL, RECONSTRUCTION: ITS TRUE BASIS 13-15, 30-33
(Boston 1865) (Speech by Rep. Boutwell at Weymouth, Mass., July 4, 1865).
224. The theoretical formation of the ideas of national order is adopted from this
author's forthcoming volume RETREAT FROM RADICALISM: THE LIBERAL REPUBLICANS OF
1872. The evidence for this thesis is drawn principally from four kinds of primary mater-
ials. The first category, public documents, includes: Congressional Globe; THE WAR OF
THE REBELLION, supra note 191; MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 185; congressional
committee reports.
The second category, newspapers and periodicals from 1865 to 1872, includes: Atlan-
tic Monthly; Chicago Tribune; Cincinnati Commercial; Louisville Courier-Journal; Mis-
souri Democrat (St. Louis); The Nation; The New-York Times; New York Tribune; New
York World; North American Review; Springfield Republican.
The third category, published contemporary memoirs and collected works of major
public figures, includes: C. ADAMS, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS 1835-1915, AN AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY (1916); J. BIGELOW, WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT (1890); J. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF
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ment of a stabilized, normalized order was a precondition to the
improvement of what they often termed American Civilization.
Civilization, defined as the ethical level of human behavior, was
directly related to the degree of stability and order in society at
any given moment. Restoration of order, therefore, became the
overriding pragmatic objective of congressional nationalists who
dreamed of a morally powerful, civilized American Union. Order
was that precious condition under which ethical relationships
among men edged upward.
"Social order" in the post-war 1860s meant a harmonious
national environment, a climate of respect for all individual
rights and property, and a predictable procedure for the success
of intellectual or economic enterprises. Order - a secure condi-
tion of tranquility- translated into law-and-order, normality,
and the absence of agitation or confusion. Order in society was
itself predicated upon the growth and perfection of democratic
institutions.15 This institutional structure - including political
CONGRESS, FROM LINCOLN TO GARFIELD (1884-86); C. CLAY, THE LIFE OF CASSIUS
MARCELLUS CLAY (1886); R. CORTIssOz, LIFE OF WHITELAW REID (1921); H. HOLT, GARRU-
LITIEs OF AN OCTOGENARIAN EDITOR (1923); G. KOERNER, MEMOIRS OF GUSTAVE KOERNER,
1809-1896 (1909); LIFE AND LETTERS OF EDWIN LAWRENCE GODKIN (R. Ogden ed. 1907);
G. MERRIAM, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SAMUEL BOWLES (1885); H. VILLARD, MEMOIRS OF
HENRY ViLLARD, JOURNALIST AND FINANCIER 1835-1900 (1904); H. WATTERSON, "MARSE
HENRY," AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1919); H. WHrrE, LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL (1913).
The fourth category, the most valuable and significant source, consists of unpub-
lished manuscript materials. Among the 66 collections consulted are those of Charles
Francis Adams (Massachusetts Historical Society); Edward Atkinson (Massachusetts
Historical Society); Francis Preston Blair Family (Library of Congress); Samuel Bowles
(Yale University); Benjamin Gratz Brown (University of Missouri, Columbia); Cassius
Marcellus Clay (Filson Club, Louisville, Kentucky); Jacob Dolson Cox (Oberlin College);
David Davis (Illinois State Historical Society, Springfield); Edwin Lawrence Godkin
(Houghton Library, Harvard University); Horace Greeley (New York Public Library);
Murat Halstead (Cincinnati Historical Society); John Hay (John Hay Library, Brown
University); George Washington Julian (Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, and Library
of Congress); Francis Lieber (Huntington Library, San Marino, California); Henry D.
Lloyd (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison); John McAuley Palmer (Illinois
State Historical Society); Whitelaw Reid (Library of Congress); Carl Schurz (Library of
Congress); Charles Sumner (Houghton Library, Harvard); Samuel Jones Tilden (New
York Public Library); Lyman Trumbull (Chicago Historical Society and Library of Con-
gress); Henry Watterson (Library of Congress); Gideon Welles (Huntington Library, San
Marino, California); David Ames Wells (Library of Congress); Horace White (Illinois
State Historical Library).
225. According to Edwin L. Godkin, founder and editor of the Nation,
The true way to prevent "sectional feeling" and "sectional agitation" is to abolish
sectional institutions, to make the bases of society and government the same in all
51
PACE LAW REVIEW
processes, party structures, an independent press, educational
agencies, governmental enactments, and constitutional guaran-
tees - functioned to sustain harmony by balancing antagonistic
social forces. Procedural arrangements buffered the anti-social
effects of competing and conflicting interests, absorbed the
shockwaves of change, and preserved the social order. Further,
orderly institutional arrangements served as arteries for dissemi-
nating ethical values to the body politic. 226 Almost by osmotic
action, institutions diffused the civilizing virtues throughout the
national community, to the end of uplifting the dissolute, in-
forming the ill-bred, enlightening the uneducated, and chasten-
ing the rebellious.227
The most significant threat to this nationalistic vision was
disorder. Instability in the national environment undermined
proper respect for laws, customs, traditions, property rights, and
freedom. In extreme cases, disorder could destroy a society; the
Civil War had so proven. During the Reconstruction period, the
seeds of recurrent disorder were sown by the continuing hetero-
geneity of the American public, the divergence of their social,
class, racial and physical conditions.2 28 In the South, social, ra-
cial and economic inequities invited unrest, anarchy, and poten-
parts of the Union, or in other words, to render it thoroughly democratic.
Godkin, The Essence of the Reconstruction Question, 1 NATION 4 (1865).
226. Samuel Bowles, editor of the Springfield [Mass.] Republican wrote:
The people of the Confederate States, of whatever race, must be Northernized by
the press, by Northern immigration to the South, by Northern missionaries and
teachers, and by all the great social and religious influences we know so well how
to set to work.
Springfield [Mass.] Republican (Daily ed.), Aug. 26, 1865. Bowles also observed that
guarantees against future attempts at revolution lay in "the utter extinction of slavery,
in form and substance, and the erection of homogeneous institutions throughout the
Country." Springfield [Mass.] Republican (Daily ed.), Oct. 12, 1865.
227. Carl Schurz, author of the influential REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE
SOUTH, supra note 61, argued that once the aspirations and desires based on the slave
system had been abolished, the mind of the Southerner
drifts into places and projects for the coming day . . . new aspirations spring up,
which closely attach themselves to the political institutions with which in this
country free labor society is identified. That is the Union, based upon general self-
government.
C. Schurz, Reconciliation by Emancipation, (Speech at Cooper Union, N.Y., Mar. 6,
1862) (Schurz MSS, Library of Congress).
228. Godkin, The Danger of the Hour, 1 NATION 357 (1865).
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tial violence among the degraded and depressed classes.2 2
Equality was the key to restored social harmony and the
remedy for disorder.230 Uniform and democratic social institu-
229. As he assessed the task of civilizing the South, Professor Charles Eliot Norton
of Harvard informed Godkin in 1866:
It is not a pleasant prospect that lies before us. To turn to barbarism for a protec-
tion against barbarism is a policy sure to lead to evils. But it seems to be our only
safety now. The temper and the character of the Southern whites are essentially
opposed to modern civilization, and to the principles on which our institutions
rest. The process of educating the South to become an integral part of a demo-
cratic community is not likely to be finished in our day.
Letter from Charles Eliot Norton to E.L. Godkin (Jan. 1, 1866) (Godkin MSS, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts). See also C. ScHuRz, REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH,
supra note 61; Godkin, Universal Suffrage and Universal Amnesty, 3 NATION 430
(1866); Godkin, Jefferson Davis's Sincerity, 2 NATION 776 (1866); Letter from Carl
Schurz to Andrew Johnson (Sept. 4, 1865) (Schurz MSS, Library of Congress); Letter
from Carl Schurz to Andrew Johnson (Sept. 1, 1865) (Schurz MSS, Library of Congress);
Letter from Carl Schurz to Mrs. Schurz (Aug. 27, 1865), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, supra
note 61, at 268; Letter from Carl Schurz to Charles Sumner (Aug. 2, 1865), reprinted in 1
SPEECHES, supra note 61, at 267.
230. [T]he continual contact with an ignorant and degraaed population must
necessarily lower the mental and moral tone of the other classes of society ....
[Tihe education of the lower orders is the only reliable basis of the civilization as
well as of the prosperity of a people.
C. SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH, supra note 61, at 25. See also C.
Schurz, The Logical Results of the War (Schurz MSS, Library of Congress) (Speech
given in Philadelphia, Sept. 9, 1866).
Senator Lyman Trumbull suggested that, with slavery abolished, "our laws are to be
enacted with a view to educate, improve, enlighten, and Christianize the negro; to make
him an independent man; to teach him to think and to reason. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866).
Samuel Bowles, editor of the Springfield [Mass.] Republican, advocated approxi-
mate economic equality and argued:
Irrespective of color, every land is full of slaves if its industrial relations are such
that labor must work for capital or die. If the society in Massachusetts were di-
vided into two classes, into shrewd, managing capitalists who own the land, and
ignorant timid laborers, who had no recourse but to work it, we should soon have
a white slavery at the North equal to anything further South in all but color and
name. The strength of a republic is in the intelligence and thrift of the masses;
whatever increases the number of small freeholders is an added element of power.
Bowles, Springfield [Mass.] Republican (Daily ed.), July 1, 1865.
Edwin L. Godkin, founder and editor of the Nation, stated:
How to raise the working classes nearer to the level of the rest of the community,
in comfort, intelligence, and self-restraint, is now the great problem both of politi-
cal and social science. As long as it is not solved, nothing is solved, nothing is
settled, nothing can be called sure or lasting.
Godkin, Cooperation, 106 N. AM. REv. 150, 172 (1868). Godkin consistently applied his
theory to the American Indian, to Mormons, or to any other potentially disruptive mi-
nority. See Godkin, The Indian Difficulty, 7 NATION 544 (1868); Godkin, Polygamy, 10
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tions would combat disorder, so that no minority, no class, no
interest, no section, and no race would long remain alienated.
The prevention of drastic discord required relieving grievances
before they became open wounds. In sum, this desire for approx-
imate equality in society sprange from no particular humanitar-
ian sentiments, sense of justice, or belief in natural rights, but
rather from the belief that inequalities bred disorder and
threatened national harmony, impeding that critical process of
dissemination of the civilizing values, by the institutional capil-
laries, to the American populace.
To the members of the 39th Congress, achievement of racial
equality was a critical ingredient in this reordering process, but
it was not the only flavor in the stew, nor was it the primary
purpose for Reconstruction policies. Racial equality was tangen-
tial to the grander scheme of establishing and maintaining the
national order. The members of the 39th Congress expected that
the South would become so thoroughly northern in morality and
mores that the conditions which had engendered disloyalty and
war would never be repeated. To the congressional mind, the
South had to adopt the Yankee system of free labor, with its
attendant entrepreneurial values.23 1 Freed blacks had to be guar-
anteed the constitutional weapons necessary to maintain their
security and status after direct northern influences were with-
drawn. Southern governments had to be controlled by loyal men
until former rebels demonstrated willing adherence to the spirit
of northern principles. 232 Above all, to the 39th Congress, south-
ern fulfillment of those prior conditions implied that the de-
feated Confederacy would be equipped for reintegration into a
harmonious national environment of northern values and
institutions.2 33
NATION 202 (1870).
231. For examples of this attitude, see Godkin, The Prospects of the Political Art,
110 N. AM. REV. 398 (1870); Godkin, What Shall We Do With the Negro? 7 NATION 386
(1868); Greeley, The True Bases of Reconstruction, N.Y. Tribune, Nov. 27, 1866, at 4,
col. 3. See also Godkin, The Moral of the Memphis Riots, 2 NATION 616 (1866); Greeley,
N.Y. Tribune, Apr. 10, 1865, at 4, col. 1.
232. See, e.g., C. Schurz, Enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment, in 1
SPEECHES, supra note 61, at 484 (Speech in the U.S. Senate, May 19, 1870); C. Schurz,
On Being Chosen United States Senator, in 1 SPEECHES, supra note 61, at 474 (Address
to Missouri Legislature, Jan. 20, 1869).
233. Compare Bowles, Springfield [Mass.] Republican (Daily ed.), July 8, 1865 and
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To summarize, members of the 39th Congress could support
with consistency the Civil Rights Act of 186684 (including
prohibitions against private discrimination), the Freedmen's Bu-
reau Act, 38 the Fourteenth Amendment,"'6 and even military
rule,23 7 as the necessary fundamentals of civilization. Those en-
actments were the primary expedients designed by a powerful
centralized government to reorder southern society and to create
a climate in which the ethical level of human behavior could im-
prove. Civil rights legislation provided a precious safety valve,
draining off discontent. The protection of civil rights through
legislation would prevent riots by producing equality; equality in
turn would end sectional agitation and lay a foundation for na-
tional harmony.3' Equality was the alternative to permanent
military occupation of the South. Rights were a political
counter-reformation.
The desire for national unity, however, also limited what
the 39th Congress might enact on behalf of the freedmen. In the
interests of order, Congress had to secure sufficient constitu-
tional safeguards to protect blacks in the exercise of their rights,
through military supervision if necessary. Once the southern en-
vironment had been normalized, Congress anticipated that the
former slaves could protect themselves through equal access to
democratic institutions in the South. Congress could not, how-
ever, extend economic benefits to blacks without alienating the
white South and jeopardizing Reconstruction. Reestablishment
of order, therefore, meant that the conversion of the white
southern mind to northern values must be entrusted to the leav-
ening action of democratic institutions introduced into the de-
feated section. Additional federal intervention, by stiffening the
backs of the ex-rebels, would threaten those delicate seeds of
conversion before they could take root.' 9
Sept. 13, 1866, with Lyman Trumbull, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 319, 936, 941
(1866) (particularly Trumbull's statements regarding protection of Indians).
234. See notes 38 & 57 supra.
235. Freedmen's Bureau Act, supra note 98.
236. See note 70 supra.
237. See note 214 supra.
238. See notes 230-33 and accompanying text supra.
239. Republicans were divided on the issue of what types of guarantees of black
civil equality would be sufficient and at what point congressional conditions would be
satisfied. See note 190 supra. Radicals, for example, believed strongly that black suffrage
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Two conditions had to be met in order to weave the South
back into the national fabric. Blacks had to be emancipated, ed-
ucated to northern ways, and protected in that endeavor with
the shield of equal rights. Southern whites had to be converted
to those same northern norms. Neither objective could be at-
tained while either segment of the southern population felt
threatened by the other and while the spectre of renewed up-
heaval lurked. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth
Amendment and military rule helped to fulfill the first condi-
tion." 0 Fulfillment of the second had to await implementation of
the first.
and free public schools in the South were necessary; their program was to be enacted for
the most part by the 40th Congress and by the southern state legislatures. On the subse-
quent retreat by Congress from Reconstruction measures, see Lyman Trumbull, CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 352, 418-19 (1870); 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1561 (1867).
See also Bowles, Springfield [Mass.] Republican (Daily ed.), Apr. 10, 1871; Nov. 11,
1867; Apr. 20, 1867; Mar. 18, 1867; Godkin, The End at Last, 10 NATION 314 (1870);
Godkin, The New Administration and the Freedman, 8 NATION 144 (1869); Godkin, The
Remaining Work of the Republican Party, 8 NATION 64 (1869); Godkin, Puritanism in
Politics, 5 NATION 275 (1867); Godkin, The Negro's Claim to Office, 5 NATION 90 (1867);
Letter from Edwin L. Godkin to Charles Eliot Norton (May 9, 1867), reprinted in 1 LIFE
AND LETTERS OF EDWIN LAWRENCE GODKIN 301 (R. Ogden ed. 1907).
240. Carl Schurz called military government a civilizing force designed "to give se-
curity and order to Southern society in a period of chaotic confusion." C. Schurz, The
Road to Peace - A Solid, Durable Peace, in 1 SPEECHES, supra note 61, at 419, 442
(Speech in Library Hall, Chicago, Sept. 19, 1868).
For Edwin L. Godkin, founder and editor of the Nation, the road to pacification and
security must be "the retention of the South under the present military regime until the
whites have got rid of whatever delusions . . . Mr. Johnson may have inspired them
with. In the meantime, military rule is doing no harm. It is the best and more civilizing
rule to which the South has ever been subjected .... " Godkin, The Reconstruction
Process, 6 NATION 144, 145 (1868). See Godkin, Congressional Reconstruction, 4 NATION
150 (1867).
In Congress, Representative George W. Julian of Indiana stated:
What these regions need, above all things, is not an easy and quick return to their
forfeited rights in the Union, but government, the strong arm of power, out-
stretched from the central authority here in Washington, making it safe for the
freedman of the South, safe for her loyal white men, safe for emigrants from the
Old World and from the northern States to go and dwell there; safe for northern
capital and labor, northern energy and enterprise, and northern ideas to set up
their habitation in peace . ...
Julian, Regeneration Before Reconstruction, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 77-
80 (1867) (Speech in the House, Jan. 28, 1867).
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VIII. Concluding Thoughts
There occur rare and fleeting moments in American history
when a Congress can escape the patterns of legislative inertia
and face the momentous issues of its time with idealism and
practical wisdom. The year 1866 was such a moment; the 39th
Congress was such a Congress. Civil strife gave birth to the na-
tionalistic ideal of a restored union based upon democratic insti-
tutions uniformly operating on behalf of every citizen. This na-
tionalistic fervor rose to fever pitch for a glorious instant to
produce the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, actions which substantially
and permanently enlarged the sphere of constitutional protec-
tions. If these enactments did not immediately affect the bed-
rock of economic and social equality, they were, nonetheless,
enormous achievements. And, if the underlying reason for these
promulgations - nationalistic zeal - was less spiritually satis-
fying than were the rhetorical expressions articulated in the con-
gressional debates - human liberty, equal justice and natural
rights - that ideal was, nevertheless, high-minded and genuine.
One hundred years later, at another rare and fleeting mo-
ment, the Supreme Court examined the import of the earlier
events. The Justices might have mistaken historic rhetoric for
historic reality. In their reading of the congressional debates, the
Justices might have imputed to the 39th Congress humanitarian
motives rather than the impetus of nationalistic fervor. On the
other hand, the majority of the Justices, affected by their cos-
mologies and alerted by the throbbing currents alive in their
own milieu, might have responded almost intuitively to the his-
toric cadences beating in the parallel environs of a century past.
Perhaps only in the late 1960s, another period of political activ-
ism and idealism, characterized by instability and the threat of
civil disorder, 4" might it have been possible for the Supreme
Court to have rescued the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from consti-
tutional oblivion. The social and political parallels between the
decades are indeed marked. Surely, the 39th Congress would
have recognized the anarchy of 1968 as precisely the brand of
disruption of free institutions that it had hoped to prevent
241. See notes 19-31 and accompanying text supra.
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through its civil rights enactments.
The historical comparison is both appropriate and useful,
but a weightier issue remains. Beneath the wrangling in Jones
over whose historical citations are more accurate, beneath any of
the specific historical issues, lies a profound and fundamental
disagreement. Implicit in the Jones decision is a dispute con-
cerning ideas about liberty and equality, about the nature of
American society and the nature of the American democratic
system. Stated simply, the problem in Jones embodies the per-
petual American dilemma: how to balance two strong ingredi-
ents in the American democratic ideology - liberty and
equality.2 42
The realization that these twin tenets of our national faith
frequently operate in opposition to one another presents itself to
policy makers and judges, and even to historians, in complicated
guises. In Jones, the restrictions which would accompany a "pri-
vate action" interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and
thereby of section 1982, would restrict liberty for the sake of
equality. Similarly, the individual freedom to choose to discrimi-
nate, which would accompany the adoption of a "state action"
construction of the 1866 Act, would result in certain denials of
equality.
Although relevant to the unrest of the 1960s and to the is-
sue before the Court, this dispute was not explicitly addressed in
Jones but was masked by consideration of another historical
time, place, and context, in which those same controversial and
disturbing issues had been debated and contested.243 This mas-
242. See M. CURTI, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN THOUGHT (3d ed. 1964); A. EKIECH,
JR., THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC TRADITION, A HISTORY (1963); R. GABRIEL, THE COURSE
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT (2d ed. 1956); J. ROCHE, THE QUEST FOR THE DREAM
(1963).
243. The majority in Jones, see notes 45-83 and accompanying text supra, and
commentators of like mind, see notes 153-68 and accompanying text supra, perceived
the 39th Congress, which struggled for the adoption of the 1866 Act, as idealistic advo-
cates of equality: men whose hatred for slavery, and whose egalitarian values, had
brought them to a moment in history when they had accepted the logical implications of
that equality; men who had been willing to employ the national power, civil and military,
to smash racial discrimination, whether state-sanctioned or privately practiced; men who
had envisioned a humane national community in which every American was guaranteed
equal treatment; men who had welcomed the opportunity to enshrine in law the noble
idea of racial equality by enacting an abolitionist version of the Thirteenth Amendment
and passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Apparently, the majority in Jones was not only
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querade makes it far more difficult to separate the Justices' his-
torical analysis from their own views. The Justices approached
their task of historical analysis encumbered by a cosmological
conditioning grounded in contemporary views on this continuing
debate.
How are liberty and equality to be balanced? Which of
those precious values is more important? No answers to those
questions will be found in the congressional debates of 1865-
1866. Moreover, an answer arrived at in one era will not
be applicable to another. In this debate as in others,
when the Supreme Court looks at -historical material for
answers, the task will be eased if that historical evidence
is as accurate as modern research can supply. In respect
of historical issues, the courts should seek the expertise of
professional historians as routinely as they solicit informa-
tion from experts on ballistics,244 science,24 5 forensic medi-
aware of the potential of an enlarged Thirteenth Amendment in the social and political
crises of the 1960s, but also recognized the 1866 Act as a valid contemporary weapon
authorizing government regulation of private relationships for the sake of social justice.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 (1968). By deciding in favor of peti-
tioner Jones, the Court recaptured that historic moment in Reconstruction, the enact-
ment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and reaffirmed what they believed to be the prior-
ity of the doctrine of equality.
The dissent in Jones, see notes 84-133 and accompanying text supra, and their sup-
porters, see notes 137-51 and accompanying text supra, examined the 1866 Act in rela-
tionship to a more limited interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. They perceived the 39th Congress as having established conditions under which
private choices might be exercised by each person on an equal footing. Enthusiastic
about the doctrine of individual free choice, and appreciative of the roots of that notion
of liberty, especially in regard to one's own property, the 39th Congress, as viewed by the
dissent in Jones, had willingly utilized national power to prevent meddling or bigoted
officials from interfering with the free exercise of private decisions. 392 U.S. at 473-74
(Harlan, J., dissenting). That preference for liberty made the dissent's 39th Congress
circumspect about federal intervention among private persons; restoration of the Union
had required the reestablishment of the concepts of self-help and social mobility and the
extension to four million freedmen of equal access to the forums of law and justice. The
dissent in Jones, appreciating the finite limits of governmental regulatory power, and
anxious to bar the door to any intruding federal presence from an expanded Thirteenth
Amendment, sought to confine the operation of the 1866 Act to state-sanctioned
discriminations.
244. See, e.g., Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Houston, 241 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1957);
Cohen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1943); King v. State, 456 P.2d 121
(Okla. Crim. App. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1049 (1970).
245. See, e.g., Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645 (1878); Winans v. New York & E.R.
Co., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88 (1858); Gisriel v. Uniroyal, 517 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1975);
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cine,"1s or psychology.2 4 7 American judges are amateurs at histor-
ical inquiry, and their perception that all opinions about the
past are equally valid may lead to historical misinterpretation
and to manipulation of the past for present socioeconomic
objectives24 8
Historians, of course, may disagree, as do ballistics special-
ists and medical practitioners. The dangers are not greater with
historians than with others. Better evidence or improved meth-
odology enhances historical interpretation and conclusions, just
as advances in medical technology upgrade the quality of the
medical opinions the courts accept.
This suggestion that courts seek the expertise of profes-
sional historians is based on the oft-rejected premise that refer-
ence to historical experience, as a guide to current wisdom, is a
legitimate and valuable enterprise2 49 The record of experience is
an unlimited resource. History is relevant: a sense of the past
provides ethical roots for and pathways to rational behavior in
our chaotic times. Every moral choice, every decision between
right and wrong, between sticking to ideals and succumbing to
Baenitz v. Ladd, 363 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968), app. dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
927 (1970).
246. See, e.g., Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Northern P.R. Co. v.
Urlin, 158 U.S. 271 (1895); Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887); Steinberg v. Indemnity
Ins. Co. of N. America, 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966); Gregory v. South Hills Movers, Inc.,
477 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732
(D.S.C. 1966).
247. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962); State v.
Donahue, 141 Conn. 656, 109 A.2d 364 (1954), app. dismissed and cert. denied, 349 U.S.
926 (1955); Rollins v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 575, 151 S.E.2d 622 (1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1026 (1967).
248. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Dred Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). See also Kelly, supra note 33; C. MILLER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
249. American ideals also rest heavily upon the notion of escape from the past, the
rejection of history in favor of nature. See C. BECKER, supra note 15; D. BOORSTIN, THE
GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1953); L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA
(1955); D. NOBLE, supra note 15. Americans must always start over - in the New World,
in the New Frontier, in new life styles. That notion of continual renaissance, even today,
remains a principal source of the doctrine of progress, of social mobility, of the open
society, of personal freedom, of a hopeful future. See P. MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WIL-
DERNESS (1956); THE NEW AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE DAWNING OF THE TECHNETRONIC
ERA (J. Rasmussen ed. 1972); J.-F. RAVEL, WITHOUT MARX OR JESUS: THE NEW AMERICAN
REVOLUTION HAS BEGUN (1971); H. SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL
AND MYTH (1950).
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expediency, has been articulated and recorded many times pre-
viously. If the costumes and circumstances have changed, the
basic drives, qualities and needs that comprise men as a species
have not.2"' Comprehension of the differences between the
human dilemma and the foreground painted by circumstances
and conditions, between human behavior and the cosmological
context, permits us to exploit collective memory. We may learn,
however vicariously, to make qualitatively preferable choices for
ourselves and just and humane choices for society.
The initial obligation to describe and assess those distinc-
tions for contemporary usage falls upon historians, for they are
uniquely qualified to distinguish continuities from changes, the
transient from the permanent. Certainly the working relation-
ships among historians, policy makers, and members of the legal
profession, which relationships require attention and strengthen-
ing, can be of enormous service to society and to the system of
justice. The sine qua non of this process is a clinical attitude
toward historical research. Its objectives are achievement of his-
torical precision in research and adoption by jurists of that re-
search as the historical record. History is a valuable guide for
jurists in reaching decisions, and an accurate historical founda-
tion in turn legitimizes those decisions.
The fascination with the decision in Jones endures, not only
because it raised questions about the historical development of
civil rights, but also because it raised questions about the nature
and direction of American society. Jones treated live historical
issues long thought closed. Jones imparted to the past a new
meaning in the present - a trick the dead might well have
enjoyed.
250. See W. BOYD, GENETICS AND THE RACES OF MAN 3-106, 323-66 (1950); L. DUNN
& T. DOBZHANSKY, HEREDITY, RACE AND SOCIETY (rev. ed. 1952); P. MOODY, INTRODUCTION
To EVOLUTION 299-438 (1953).
1980]
61
